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INTRODUCIION

D

URING the last two decades, unprecedented numbers of people
have been sentenced to prison m the Umted States. A number
of explanations for this phenomenon abound, but at least one primary
factor is the justice system responding to what it perceives to be a
growing public demand for prison sentences. Other reasons for the
increase in incarceration include: increased media emphasis on crime,
the abandonment of rehabilitation as a method for dealing with
criminals, the introduction of sentencing guidelines, the equating of
pumshment with imprisonment, the political advantage politicians
perceive in a "tough" approach to crime and the continued conviction
that pumshment deters criminal behavior.
As was the case with street crime in the 1980's, current environmental law enforcement efforts focus on expanding the definition of behavior that may be subject to incarceration.' As environmental law
looks to the option of imprisonment, however, the balance of the
criminal justice system is beginning to develop alternatives to imprisonment in reaction to the rise in street crime. 2 State and local governments seek alternatives to prison because they can no longer justify
the high costs and overcrowding m prison when the goals of deterring
crime and reducing the number of criminals on the streets are not
being achieved. 3 This Article attempts to highlight some of these
* Kitch, Saurbier, Drutchas, Wagner & Kenney, P.C., Detroit, Miclugan; B.A.,
University of Wisconsin, 1987; J.D., Northern Illinois Umversity, 1991; LL.M., University of Wisconsin Law School, 1993. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Professor Walter J. Dickey, University of Wisconsin Law School. The views

expressed m this Article are solely those of the author.
1. See generally Joseph F Sheley, Structural Influences on the Problem of Race,
Crime, and CriminalJustice Discrimination, 67 TUL. L. Rnv 2273 (1993) (custody-

deterrence approach has failed to reduce crime levels); Robert Blecker, Haven or
Hell? Inside Lorton CentralPrison: Experiences of PunishmentJustified,42 STAN. L.
R-v 1149 (1990) (examines the reasons for incarceration and its impact on pris-

oners).
2. Walter J. Dickey, Sentencing, Parole, and Community Supervision, in DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE TENSION BETWEEN INDIVIDUALIZATION AND UNIFORMITY 136, 152 (Lloyd E. Ohlin & Frank J. Remington eds., 1993).

3. See generally David H. Norris & Thomas Peters, Fiscal Responsibility and
Criminal Sentencing in Illinois: The Time for Change is Now, 26 J. MARSHALL L.
REv 317 (1993) (examination of more cost-efficient alternatives to imprisonment);

John Doble, Using Alternative Sentences: The Views of the People of Alabama, 73
JUDICATURE

220 (1990) (states are increasingly considering the use of intermediate
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changing criminal justice practices and their impact on environmental
law enforcement.
Parts I through III evaluate sentencing policies in environmental
law and discuss problems encountered when environmental law offenders are given prison terms. Part I traces the history of sentencing
m the environmental, context and then addresses the impact that
changes in criminal law enforcement have had on the environmental
law field in the past decade. It examines the expansion of criminal
liability as a result of the changing defiition of environmental crimes
and the increasingly severe sentences under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.
Part II explains why incarceration, as a response to environmental
crimes, is increasingly favored, but questions whether offenders are
actually serving time in prison. This section also posits the theory that
the trend in environmental law is part of a larger trend against whitecollar crime.

Part III discusses several problems associated with imprisoning environmental offenders and suggests that the legal system could gainfully impose less costly, non-prison sentences. This alternative is
supported by legal scholars who are apprehensive about using prison
sentences, not only because of the cost and overcrowding, but also
because imprisonment might actually deter socially desirable behavior
and harshly punish those who inadvertently break complex laws and
commit minor violations.4 Additionally, critics claim that inprisonment will not aid the goal of reducing the generation and improper
disposal of hazardous wastes.' After exploring these problems, this
Article discusses possible solutions.
Part IV incorporates a survey which demonstrates how the public
perceives sentencing policies, and challenges the policy of subjecting
environmental offenders to incarceration. The survey is used in determining how members of the public respond to the imprisonment trend
and whether the participants, after learnig about the specifics of the
offense, the offender and the sentencing guidelines, favor prison or an
alternative sentence. 6 It starts with a pre-test, during which the participants sentenced three offenders based upon details about the offense and offender. Next, the participants discussed the purposes and
costs of sentencing and learned about alternatives to prison. Following the discussion, participants resentenced the offenders during a
post-test. Consistent with similar surveys in Alabama and Delaware,
sanctions or alternatives to incarceration because of limited financial resources and
prison overcrowding).
4. See discussion nfra part IH.A.
5. See discussion infra part III.B.
6. Lauren A. Lundin, A Wisconsin Survey: Public Perceptions Regarding the
Punishment of White-Collar Offenders (Summer 1992) (unpublished survey, on file
with author) [hereinafter Survey].
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the post-test results make greater use of alternative sentences such as
community service.7
The final section of the survey analyzes the significance of these
conclusions. The survey found that the informed participants favored
alternative sentences over prison for certain offenders. The section
questions the imprisonment trend in environmental law, partially in
response to the survey results and argues for the need for further
study to gauge public attitudes toward sentencing.
I.

THE HISTORY OF SENTENCING

AND SENTENCING TRENDs IN

ENVIRONMvENTAL LAW

This section's historical overview, which focuses on society's response to street crime as an analog to the environmental crime problem, offers insight into designing sentences for environmental
offenders. The environmental law field must grapple with many of the
same sentencing problems that street crimes have dealt with since the
1980's: high prison costs, prison overcrowding and problems with
deterrence.
History of Sentencing

A.

Before one can understand how environmental offenders are sentenced, the environmental punishment scheme must first be placed
into its historical perspective. This section provides a brief overview
of three major sentencing periods: the classical, indeterminacy and
rules and punishment periods. Exploring past and present sentencing
trends raises the question of who has been, and who should be, responsible for constructing sentencing policies and designing sentences.
1.

Classical Period

The classical or "justice" model dominated sentencing philosophies
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.' During that period, the sole purpose of sentencing was viewed as punishment and
was directly proportional to society's determination of the seriousness
of an offense. The legislature created statutes that contained fixed
punishments, so that an offender's personal background and individual personality usually did not factor into his sentence.
7. Intermediate Sanctions and Public Opinion, OVERCROWDED TIMES, May 1991,
at 12 and Survey Shows AlabamiansSupport Alternatives, OVERCROWDED TImEs, Jan.
1991, at 2, reprinted in WISCONSIN CORRECONAL SYSTEM REVIEW PANEL, FINAL
REPORT app. at 14-23 (1991) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
8. Dickey, supra note 2, 136-38.
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2. Indeterminacy Period
Around the 1920's and 1930's, the positivist, rehabilitative and mdeterminacy sentencing period replaced the justice model.9 The offender's character was viewed as a more significant factor in
sentencing than the seriousness of the offense. The courts designed
sentences to reflect the defendant's cultural background and personal
deficiencies. The system perceived a person's crime as an outgrowth
of personal illness rather than an intentional act. Trained probation
and parole agents examined the offender to determine the specific illness and to propose treatment. The goal was to treat and to "normalize" an offender, not merely to punish him.1° The system used
probation, parole and frequently indeterminate sentences to rehabilitate the offender. Society preferred that administrative courts, such as
parole boards, determine sentences rather than leave the process in
the control of the legislature.
3.

Rules and Punishment Period

In the 1970's, rules and punishment usurped the rehabilitative
model of sentencing for environmental crime. Rehabilitation was
viewed as too lenient and unable to affect offenders. The legal system
was perceived as unfairly using its discretion in imposing harsh
sentences, particularly when dealing with poor, non-white offenders. 1
The hopes for rehabilitation were eclipsed by the goal of punishment,
and prison became its most utilized form.
Rigid rules were promulgated to fix standard levels of punishment.
The expectation was that the rules would remove the court's discretion and its ability to impose discriminatory sentences. The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) reflect a rule-based punishment
scheme, harkening back to the classical period.' 2 However, legislatures, courts and adminimstrative tribunals still contribute substantially
to sentencing decisions, and states also have not automatically and
uniformly changed their sentencing statutes.' 3
4.

Recent Developments

The punishment scheme is largely responsible for the current unprecedented problems with jail overcrowding. Due to the continued
perception that prison can deter and punish, the system is sending
more people to jail. Increased prison sentencing is a product of the
9. SANDRA SHANE-DuBow ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING
FORM IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY, CONTENT, AND EFFECT 6 (1985).

10. Id.
11. Dickey, supra note 2, at 152-53.
12. See discussion supra part I.A.1.
13. Dickey, supra note 2, at 152-53.

RE-
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legal system's response to public pressure to lock up dangerous
criminals.' 4
It may be no coincidence that a movement is underway to find alternatives to prison sentencing. State and local governments are considering intermediate sanctions that try to mitigate prison costs and
overcrowding. These sanctions are favored because people no longer
strongly believe that issuing prison terms can deter crime or accomplish other goals.
Who should design these alternative sentences? From observations
about the sentencing practices of Wisconsin parole agents, this section
proposes following the suggestion of legal scholars: allow people who
have daily experience with sentencing to influence sentencing
decisions.' 5
Legal scholars explain that the beliefs of lawmakers regarding sentencing and the goals they accomplish influence how the laws are written and enforced. 6 As these convictions are modified, the laws
change in response. This accounts for the dramatic changes from punishment to indeterminate sentencing and then back to the classical
model. Legislators design sentences based more upon their own opmions and the political reaction than on whether a sentence actually
accomplishes a particular goal. For example, today's prevailing notion
continues to be that prison can deter, despite the fact that those who
have direct experience with imprisoned offenders state that prison
does not, in fact, accomplish this goal.' 7 Legal scholars argue that the
legal system should not rely on ideology to design sentences, but instead should directly observe sentencing practices and design
sentences based on that information.' 8
A Wisconsin-based sentencing system exemplifies how sentencers
can design effective sentences once they understand how sentencing
works. Probation and parole agents in Wisconsin have achieved some
success in sentencing because they had the discretion to design
sentences according to their experience and expertise,' 9 as well as the
needs of the individual and the community Before designing their
systems, agents spent time with the offenders and the community to
determine the sentence that would be most beneficial for both. This is
a system where people "in the field" determined "what works for
what offenders in what settings."2 ° Although the system is not regulated by a strict rules and punishment model, the sentences are
14. Id.
15. Id. at 157-58.

16. Id.
17
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 160.
Id. at 163.
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"checked by guidelines, supervisors, the people in the community with
whom they work, and the culture of the correctional system .... 21
B. Sentencing Trends in EnvironmentalLaw
Environmental law is going through a trend similar to the cycle experienced during the classical era, in stark contrast with the current
attitude supporting alternative sentencing for street crimes. Specifically, the environmental law field is labelling more offenses as crnminal and attempting to punish offenders through prison sentences. In

the same fashion that sentencers changed their attitude in punishing
street crime, those who sentence environmental offenders should
question this imrpnsonment trend. The trend is reflected by: (1) the

Guidelines' harsher sanctions for criminal environmental offenders;
(2) more prosecutions because of expanded definitions of criminal behavior; and (3) the government's increasing interest in criminal prosecution of environmental offenders.
1. Harsher Sanctions Under the Guidelines
Before the 1980's, administrative or civil sentences were common
for all but the most egregious environmental offenders.2 2 Today, adminstrative and civil sanctions are touted as punishments of the past,
as the justice system attacks environmental offenders through criminal
prosecutions and threats of mandatory jail sentences under the Guide-

lines. 23 For example, under the Guidelines, an environmental
offender received a thirty-six month prison sentence for filling

21. Id.
22. Kevin A. Gaynor, A System Spinning Out of Control, ENVTL. F., May-June
1990, at 28; David Stipp, Toxic Turpitude:Environmental Crime Can Land Executives
in Prison These Days, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 1990, at Al.
23. Sentencing Rules are Tough on White-Collar Crime, PA. L.J. RPp., Apr. 20,
1987, at 5F; Stuart E. Abrams & Vincent J. Connelly, Prosecutors Get Tough on
White-Collar Crime, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 27, 1989, at 15; Stipp, supra note 14, at 1; Paul
Thomson, A New Cost of Business for EnvironmentalViolators, ENVTL. F., May-June
1990, at 32; Marianne Lavelle, Guidelines Get Tepid Reception; Defining Environmental Crimes,NAT'L L.i., Aug. 26, 1991, at 3; Allan R. Gold, Increasingly,Prison Term is
the Pricefor Polluters,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1991, at B6; Judson W Starr, Turbulent
Times at Justice and EPA: The Origins of Environmental CriminalProsecutionsand
the Work That Remains, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 900, 900-02 (1991); Susan Hedman,
Expressive Functionsof CriminalSanctions in EnvironmentalLaw, 59 GEO. WASH. L.
Rnv 889, 893-99 (1991); Robert I. McMurray & Stephen D. Ramsey, Environmental
Crime: The Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Environmental Laws, 19 Loy.
L.A. L. RFv 1133,1143-44 (1986); see generally Linda S. Weiss-Malik, ImposingPenal
Sanctions on the Unwary CorporateExecutive: The Unveiled CorporateCriminal,17
U. TOL. L. RFv. 383 (1986).
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in wetlands, 24 an offense that traditionally carried only civil penal-

ties.25
Harsher criminal penalties were designed for environmental violators under the Guidelines 26 which became effective on November 1,
1987.27 The Guidelines contain sentences that are mandatory, fixed
and virtually inflexible to ensure uniformity and certainty in sentencmg.8 The lengths of sentences are computed through rigid mathematical equations.2 9
The Guidelines' strict sentencing policies prohibit courts from considering most aspects of a defendant's background when sentencing.
The Guidelines reflect the congressional mandate that "in recommending a term of impnsonment or length of a term of imprisonment," it is inappropriate to consider the defendant's "education,
vocational skills, employment record, [or] family ties ... "30 This
24. United States v. Pozsgai, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 579 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 1989),
affd, 897 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 812 (1990); see also United
States v. Mills, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2633 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 1989) (twenty-one
month prison sentence); Paul D. Kamenar, EnvironmentalProtection or Enforcement
Overkill, EivrL. F., May-June 1990, at 29 (discussion of recent criminal
prosecutions).
25. Judson W Starr & Thomas I. Kelly, Jr., Environmental Crimes and the Senand it is Hard Time, 20 Envtl. L. Rep.
tencing Guidelines: The Time Has Come
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,096, 10,097 n.9 (1990) (citing United States v. Holland, No. 83-891
(S.D. Fla. filed May 27,1988)); see also United States v. Marathon Dev. Corp., No. 87129 (D. Mass. filed Apr. 4, 1987), affd, 867 F.2d 96 (1st Cir. 1989) (suspended sixmonth sentence and one year probation); United States v. Bill Walters Cos., No. 88375 (D. Colo. filed Dec. 22, 1989) (pre-sentencmg guidelines case where defendant
was fined $10,000 and received no prison term).
26. Chapter Eight of the Guidelines contains strict sentences for most corporate
defendants. However, Chapter Eight partially bars environmental offenses from its
fine provisions, thereby forcing courts to follow pre-Guideline sentences for corporate
environmental offenders. United States Sentencing Commission, GuidelinesManual,
§§ 8A1.1-8E1.3 (Nov. 1992); Gary S. Lincenberg, Sentencing EnvironmentalCases, 29
AM. CRiM. L. REv 1235, 1239-40, 1256-57 (1992); Richard S. Gruner, U.S. Sentencing
Commission Proposals on Corporate Fines and Probation May Shock Corporate
America Because They Propose Treating White-Collar Offenders as Criminals,NAT'L
L.J., Apr. 2, 1990, at 13; Environmental Crimes and the Sentencing Guidelines, supra
note 17, at 10,102; Jeffery M. Kaplan & William K. Perry, The High Cost of Corporate
Crime, MGMTr. Accr., Dec. 1991, at 43. Chapter Eight's provisions correspond to the
culpability and pecuniary gains of a company. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.4, comment.
27 Rules are contained in the United States Sentencing Commssion, Guidelines
Manual (Nov. 1992). See Gold, supra note 15, at B6 (potential criminal penalties for
white-collar offenders under the Guidelines); Stephen D. Ramsey, CorporateOfficer
and Director Liability Under Superfund and the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, 2317 ALI-ABA 271 (1988) [hereinafter Ramsey 1]; Stephen D. Ramsey, Corporate Officer and Director Liability Under Superfund and the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series no. 660, 1989)
[hereinafter Ramsey II]; Thomson, supra note 23, at 26.
28. Starr & Kelly, supra note 25, at 10,097.
29. Some of the goals of the Guidelines are to remove jurisdictional disparity and
ensure consistency in sentencing. Id., Sentencing Rules are Tough on White-Collar
Crime, supra note 23, at 5F
30. 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (1988).
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attempt to stop courts from unfairly sentencing various offenders resuits in limiting a court's discretion in sentencing.
Though the Guidelines are quite rigid, they do contain some flexibility; however, this flexibility works, in most instances, to the detriment of the environmental offender. 3 ' For example, if defendants
abuse their position of trust or use their education, training, or position to commit an offense, the Guidelines allow an upward adjustment,32 possibly subjecting the offender to mandatory incarceration.
The Guidelines also make certain upward adjustments if the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager or supervisor.33
2. Recently Expanded Defimtions of Criminal
Environmental Behavior
The justice system's ability to criminally prosecute is now simpler as
a consequence of legally expanded definitions of criminal behavior.
The Guidelines treat first-offenders, regulatory offenders and those
who have not harmed the environment as criminals. In addition to
case law support of the Guidelines' treatment of these offenders, the
federal criminal environmental statutes and the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine (RCO) lower the culpability standard. This
combination expands the scope of behavior subject to criminal prosecution beyond anything previously seen.
a. Guidelines
Under the Guidelines, the spectrum of environmental offenses subject to criminal sanctions has been greatly widened. First-offenders,
permit violators and those responsible for the emission of non-toxic
substances into the environment are subject to criminal sentences
under Chapter Two, Part Q, entitled "Offenses Involving the
Environment."
31. See Starr & Kelly, supra note 25, at 10,098 (detailed discussion of flexibility
and rigidity of Guidelines in relation to environmental offenders); Edward M. Shaw,
Plea Bargaining White-Collar Offenses Under Federal Sentencing Guidelines, N.Y.

L.J., May 25, 1990, at 1; Robert G. Morvillo, Upward Mobility Under the Sentencing
Guidelines, N.Y. LJ., Oct. 1, 1991, at 3. For a detailed analysis of criminal environmental provisions under the Guidelines, see generally Lmcenberg, supra note 26.
The following Guidelines' sections provide flexibility in sentencing: (1) U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.2 allows a downward adjustment if the defendant played a "mitigating role" in
the crime; (2) under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), a court is free to depart from the guidelines
based upon any "aggravating or mitigating circumstance, of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration" by the guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0; (3) several
specific departures are listed in U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.1-5K2.16.

Section 5K2.0 (Grounds for Departure) states that it is impossible to make an exhaustive list of mitigating factors. Section 5K2.16 provides circumstances under which
voluntary disclosure will result in downward departures, but few cases may meet the
six requirements.
32. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3.

33. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c).
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First-time environmental offenders are subject to criminal penalties
under the Guidelines' "knowing endangerment" section despite a previously clean criminal record.3 4 For example, if a first-time offender

violates this section under RCRA, CWA or CAA, he will receive a
into a
base offense level of twenty-four points which translates
35
mandatory jail sentence of fifty-one to sixty-three months.

An offender is also subject to criminal penalties if he does not have
a permit for his environmental activities, 36 regardless of whether or

not the activities caused environmental harm. 37 The Guidelines require a court to enhance an environmental offender's base offense
level of eight levels to twelve levels if the "offense involved transpor-

tation, treatment, storage, or disposal without a permit or in violation
of a permit. '38 Under the "Sentencing Table," an offense level of
twelve requires mandatory impnsonment ranging from ten to sixteen
months.39
Finally, under section 2Q1.2(b)(1), even if a discharge of "hazardous or toxic" substances does not harm the environment, the base offense level of eight, automatically increases by four levels.4" An
offense level of twelve subjects
the offender to a mandatory ten to
41
sixteen month jail sentence.
b.

Case Law Supports These Expansions

Case law supports the Guidelines' use of prison sentences for firstoffenders for contamination violations which do not result in harm.42
In United States v. Ellen,4 3 the court held that first-time environmental
offenses are serious enough to warrant incarceration. While United
States v. Bogas" stated that a court can make an enhancement based
34. See U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.1.
35. See discussion infra part I.B.2.c.
36. The Comission refers to regulatory offenses as reporting, recording, keeping,
tampering, and falsification violations involving hazardous substances or other pollutants, as well as mishandling of toxic substances or other pollutants. See U.S.S.G.
§ 2Q1.2 (Mishandling of Hazardous or Toxic Substances or Pesticides; Recordkeepmg, Tampering, and Falsification); U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.3 (Mishandling of Other Environmental Pollutants; Recordkeeping, Tampering, and Falsification); U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.
A(4)(f). See also Lmcenberg, supra note 26, at 1240-41.
37. See U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.2(b)(4).
38. Id.
39. After deterimmng the offense level and the Criminal History category under
Chapter Four, the court uses the sentencing table in Chapter Five to compute the
sentence. U.S.S.G. Ch.5, Pt. A (Sentencing Table).
40. U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.2(b)(1)(B). A continuous discharge of such a substance increases the offense level by 6. U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.2(b)(1)(A).
41. U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A (Sentencing Table).
42. United States v. Sellers, 926 F.2d 410,418 (5th Cir. 1991) (allowing a four-level
increase under subsection (b)(1) after discovering one barrel of hazardous waste was
leaking, although the discovery occurred one day after the disposal).
43. 961 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 217 (1992).
44. 920 F.2d 363, 367-68 (6th Cir. 1990); see U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.2(b)(1)(B) (1991);
Lmcenberg, supra note 26, at 1242.
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upon actual contamination and not harm. Furthermore, United States
v. Goldfaden45 held that regardless of contamination or harm to the
environment, under section 2Q1.2(b)(1)(A), a six-level increase for
continuous discharge is acceptable.
Not only do the Guidelines and cases broaden the scope of the defiition of criminal behavior, but many cases have expanded criminal
liability through the interpretation of the knowledge element contamed in federal criminal environmental statutes.
c. Lower Knowledge Standard
Environmental offenders are subject to crimial sanctions under the
following federal environmental statutes: Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or Superfund),46 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA),47 the Clean Water Act (CWA), 48 the Clean Air Act
(CAA),4 9 the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) 50 and many other

non-environmental criminal statutes. 51 Under most of these federal
environmental statutes, knowledge is a required element for criminal
prosecution.
Courts' Interpretations of the Knowledge Element
Courts frequently interpret the statutes in a manner that lowers the
level of knowledge necessary for a criminal conviction.5 z This is exemplified by judicial interpretations of RCRA.
Under RCRA, 53 criminal liability attaches if one: (1) "knowingly
transports or causes to be transported any hazardous waste identified
or listed under this subchapter.. "to an unpermitted facility,54 or (2)
"knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste.. (A)
i.

45. 959 F.2d 1324, 1331 (5th Cir. 1992), appealafter remand, 987 F.2d 225 (5th Cir.

1993).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b)(3) (Supp. 1993). See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657
(1988).

47 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(d)-(e) (Supp. 1993). See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987

(1988); 15 U.S.C. §§ 6991-6992k (Supp. 1993).
48. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c), 1319(c)(3) (Supp. 1993). See generally 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1376 (1986); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1377-1387 (Supp. 1993).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (Supp. 1993). See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988);
15 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7671q (Supp. 1993).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(b) (Supp. 1993). See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982);
15 U.S.C. §§ 2641-2692 (Supp. 1993).
51. See Ramsey I, supra note 27 (detailed and comprehensive list of criminal sanctions under federal environmental statutes); Ramsey II, supra note 27.
52. See generally Eva M. Fromm, Commanding Respect: Criminal Sanctions for
Environmental Crimes, 21 ST. MARY'S LJ.821 (1990) (comprehensive discussion of
the criminal liability requirements and corresponding case law under RCRA, CERCLA, CWA, CAA, TSCA, as well as other applicable crminal statutes).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d); see also 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (provision on "knowing
endangerment").
54. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1).
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without a permit... ; or (B) in knowing violation of any material
condition or requirement of such permit; or (C) in knowing violation
a regulation or
of any material condition or requirement of..."
standard. 55
Courts differ on how to interpret the knowledge requirement under
RCRA 6 The question is whether to require knowledge for every element of the statute. If such knowledge were required, potential offenders would have to (1) know that they are handling waste
identified or listed as hazardous, (2) know that they must have a permit to handle such waste, and (3) know that they are lacking a permit
or are operating m violation of permit requirements.
The Third Circuit has interpreted RCRA as requiring such knowledge. 7 Other courts have disagreed and have held that a defendant
does not have to know whether the statute lists the waste as hazardous
or whether the receiving facility has a permit. The following court
decisions illustrate the lower standard promulgated under RCRA.
In United States v. Dee,5 8 the lower court said that an offender must
have "knowledge of the hazardous character of the wastes."5 9 The
Fourth Circuit noted one case where the standard was that a "defendant had to know that the chemicals had potential to harm others or
the environment."6 Since most chemicals have that potential, the
court's interpretation treats the knowledge standard as a strict liability
standard.'
In contrast, the court m United States v. Greer,6' held that the government need not prove that a defendant knew the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) listed or identified the waste as hazardous.
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(d)(2)(A)-(C).
56. See generally Fromm, supra note 52 (detailed discussion of case law interpreting the knowledge requirement for federal criminal environmental statutes).
57. United States v. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d 662, 664-65 (3rd Cir. 1984), cerL
denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). For a discussion of the knowledge requirement as applied to corporate officers, see Steven M. Morgan & Allison K. Obermann, Perils of
the Profession: Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine May Facilitatea DramaticIncrease in CriminalProsecutionsof Environmental Offenders, 45 Sw. LI. 1199 (1991)).
Contra United States v. Hoflin, 800 F.2d 1033, 1038-39 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that
"), cert.
"knowledge of the absence of a permit is not an element of the offense
denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990); see also United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d
1499, 1503-04 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that permit knowledge was required, but admitting that it was unclear as to how broadly the requirement extended).
58. 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 (1991).
59. Id. at 745.
60. Id. (citing United States v. Greer, 850 F.2d 1447, 1450 (11th Cir. 1988), reh'g
denied, 860 F.2d 1092 (11th Cir. 1988)).
61. Jed S.Rakoff, Moral Qualms About Environmental Prosecutions,N.Y. L.J.,
July 11, 1991, at 3; see Fromm, supra note 52, at 832 n.71, for a list of cases where the
court has imposed a jail sentence under RCRA. See also Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d
at 1503 (government need only prove the substance had the "potential to be harmful

to others, or the environment").

62. 850 F.2d 1447, 1450 (11th Cir. 1988), reh'g denied, 860 F.2d 1092 (11th Cir.

1988).
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The court in Greer imposed a five-year prison term, suspending all but
ninety days of the sentence.6 3 Hence, an offender can face criminal
prosecution regardless of whether they knew their actions were illegal.
In United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc.,6 4 the defendant sent
waste to an unpermitted facility. The court required proof that the
defendant knew the facility did not have a permt.65 The court left
room for future courts to lower the threshold level required to prove
knowledge. The court said that the jury need not find actual knowledge. Rather, it could infer knowledge based upon that person's position in the company and his relationship to other employees. 66 Again,
it was established that even if the officers were unaware of the illegality of their actions - in this case that the facility did not have a permit
they would be deemed to have violated the relevant criminal
provisions.
ii.RCO Doctrine
Corporate officers are also subject to greater criminal prosecution
under the RCO doctrine. Prosecutors can use the RCO doctrine to
avoid proving knowledge under federal criminal environmental statutes. The RCO doctrine comes from case law based on the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA).67 Courts borrowed
the RCO doctrine from FDCA case law because both are public welfare statutes.68 The theory of the RCO doctrine is that corporate officers are criminally accountable for the illegal activities of their
employees. More precisely, they are accountable if they "had, by reason of [their] position in the corporation, responsibility and authority
either to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to correct the violation complained of, and that [they] failed to do so. '' 69 Under the RCO
doctrine, courts can criminally convict
officers regardless of whether
70
they knew of the illegal activities.
The Supreme Court promulgated this doctrine m United States v
Dotterweich.7 ' In Dotterweich, the court first debated the issue of
63. See Enforcement: HazardousWaste Site Operatorto be Jailedfor CriminalActions at Florida Facilities, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 832 (1986).
64. 741 F.2d at 662.

65. Id. at 669.
66. Id. at 670; contra United States v. Hoflin, 800 F.2d 1033, 1038-39 (9th Cir.
1989) (holding that "knowledge of the absence of a permit is not an element of the
offense
"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990).
67. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a) (1988).
68. McMurray & Ramsey, supra note 23, at 1152-53.
69. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673-74 (1975).
70. Ramsey I, supra note 27; Ramsey II,supra note 27; Keith A. Onsdorff &
James M. Mesnard, The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine in RCRA Criminal
Enforcement" What You Don't Know Can Hurt You, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,099, 10,101-05 (1992); Morgan & Obermann, supra note 57, at 1200-09.
71. 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (federal government prosecuted a corporate president
under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act for shipping adulterated drugs).
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72
criminally convicting a corporate officer because of his position.
And as much as thirty years later, the Supreme Court m United States
v Park73 affirmed its policy of holding a corporate officer criminally
liable because of his position in the corporation. The Court imposed a
duty upon the officer to detect and remedy violations of the FDCA. 74
Prosecutors have, with varying success, used the language of the
RCO doctrine to avoid having to prove that the officers knew of employees' illegal activities. The following two cases highlight the use of
the RCO doctrine. In the first case, the government explicitly argued
RCO doctrine language but without success. In the second case, the
government used more subtle language. 75 Establishing the officer's
knowledge through circumstantial evidence, the latter arguments
succeeded.
In United States v MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.,7 6 the government charged the president of the defendant corporation under
RCRA with knowingly transporting and causing such transportation
of hazardous waste to an unpermitted facility. The government admitted that it lacked evidence that the defendant knew of the violations.
Nonetheless, the government argued under the RCO doctrine that the
officer either knew or should have known about the illegal transport.
The court sentenced the officer to three years imprisonment,7 7 but the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated and remanded the conviction.78 The court refused to apply the RCO doctrine because the statute specifically required knowledge and the
president would be subject to mandatory jail time under the Guidelines.7 9 The court, however, left the door open for future arguments
and said that the government could prove knowledge based upon circumstantial evidence, such as the officer's "position and responsibility" within the company or the "willful blindness to the facts
constituting the offense."8
In United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc.,8 the government
achieved greater success. Here, the Umted States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit did not mention the RCO doctrine, but the opinion did contain RCO language. The court said that knowledge could
be referred from circumstantial evidence of the corporate officer's

72. Id.
73. 421 U.S. at 658.
74. Id. at 673-74.

75. Rakoff, supra note 61, at 3.
76. 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
77. OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT, EPA,

SUMMARY OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS RE-

SULTING FROM ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS
MARY 1992].

78. MacDonald,933 F.2d at 61.

79. Id. at 55.
80. Id.
81. 934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1991).

75-76 (1992) [hereinafter SuM-
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"detailed knowledge of and control over" company operations. 2
Therefore, the jury was free to conclude, based upon only circumstantial evidence, that the defendant participated in the illegal storage. 3
The government can now use RCO doctrine language to subject

corporate officers to a greater risk of being imprisoned. The RCO
doctrine allows the government to criminally convict more offenders
because it eases the burden of proving the officers' knowledge of their
subordinates' activities.
iii.

States

An environmental violator is also subject to criminal penalties
under state environmental laws. Various states have increased the

number of criminal prosecutions and lowered the requisite standard of

proof of knowledge.84 Not all states have followed suit. Some states

use higher culpability standards or lighter sentences to protect an offender from criunal prosecution.8 5
Nevertheless, environmental offenders are now subject to greater
threats of incarceration because the Guidelines, environmental stat-

utes and case law are defimng more forms of environmental behavior
as criminal.
3. Increased Interest in Criminally Prosecuting Offenders
Today, prosecutors have the necessary weapons to impnson environmental offenders and have openly discussed their desire to aggres-

sively prosecute.8 6 The justice system has vowed to prosecute not only

"midnight dumpers," those who intentionally dump waste, but also

82. Id. at 617.
83. Id. at 616-17. The executive vice-president and operations manager obtained
new trials because the court felt the jury confused them with the corporate defendant.
Id. at 618. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Crtmmal"?" Reflections
on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REv 193
(1991) (discussion of white-collar crime prosecutions).
84. Most states have statutes containing criminal provisions. See John DeCicco &
Edward Bonanno, A Comparative Analysis of the Criminal Environmental Laws of
the Fifty States: The Need for Statutory Uniformity as a Catalystfor Effective Enforcement of Existing and ProposedLaws, 5 J. LAND USE & ENvrL. L. 1, 2 & n.1 (1989);
James M. McElfish, Jr., State Hazardous Waste Crimes, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,465 (1987) (a discussion of particular states that utilize strict liability statutes,
such as California, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Michigan); Robert J. Kafin & Gail
S. Port, CriminalSanctions Lead to HigherFines and Jail,NAT'L L.J., July 23, 1990, at
20.
85. McElfish, supra note 84.
86. Fromm, supra note 52, at 823; see generally Onsdorff & Mesnard, supra note
70 (discussion of the justice department's expansive prosecution of corporate officers,
whose action often ignores the traditional requirement of personal knowledge of
criminal conduct); Ramsey II, supra note 27 (discussion of the EPA's and the DOJ's
increased use of criminal indictments to improve deterrence by holding corporate officers directly responsible).
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environmental offenders who have never faced criminal prosecution.87
"[T]he days of community service and probation are over."88 "Our
message about environmental law is simple. Polluters will pay ....
Environmental crime is no less a crime than theft or blackmail or assault. And more and more assuredly, if you do the crime, you'll do
the time."8 9
Statistics suggest that many environmental offenders have spent
time in jail, adding to the belief that impending criminal prosecution is
a reality.9" Business magazines caution the business community to
take note of new and existing laws because "[m]ore than half the mdividuals convicted for environmental crimes m fiscal year 1990 were
given prison sentences; [and] about 85 percent of those serve their
time." 91 These magazines warn that the average prison term is "in
Other articles indicate even greater sanctions,
excess of one year."'
stating that individuals convicted of environmental felonies "will
likely serve two years in jail."9 3 One article warns the environmental
industry that they are targets for criminal prosecution.94 An EPA
spokesperson states that "[w]hite-collar corporate criminals can expect no breaks from this adminstration... and those we convict can
count on stiff sentences." 95
Thus, an arsenal of criminal sanctions is in place to translate the
tough-on-crime attitude into appropriate action. Environmental offenders are on notice that they may face jail time. All of the legal
tools are available to successfully prosecute and imprison environmental violators.
II.

FACTORS ACCOUNTING FOR THE INCARCERATION TREND

Before examining the factors accounting for the trend, it is impor-

tant to understand that the following list of reasons is not exhaustive.
Explaining the reasons behind a legal change is a complex and potentially impossible task. A multitude of factors must be considered, such
87. Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws Seeks Deterrence Amid Need
for Increased Coordination, Training, Public Awareness, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 800
(Sept. 26, 1986) [hereinafter CriminalEnforcement of Environmental Laws].
88. Gaynor, supra note 22, at 28.
89. Enforcement: Enforcement Actions at EPA Continue to Climb in Civil, Criminal Cases, Penalty Assessments, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1832 (Nov. 29,1991) (statement
of previous EPA Administrator, William K. Reilly) [hereinafter Enforcement Actions
at EPA].
90. Morgan & Obermann, supra note 57; see generally Jane M. Kravcik & Vicki 0.
Materman, A Private Sector Perspectiveon FederalEnvironmental Enforcement, C722

ALI-ABA 509 (1992).
Business, 79 NATION's Bus., Sept. 1991, at
56. 91. Ripley Hotch, A CriminalTrap For
92. Id.
93. Gaynor, supra note 22, at 28; Stipp, supra note 22, at 1.
94. Hotch, supra note 91, at 56.
95. Enforcement Actions At EPA, supra note 89, at 1832.

58

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. V

as the influence of various activist groups, lawmakers, lobbyists, the
media, the historical context, etc. 96 Hence, tis section highlights
some of the factors driving the imprisonment trend.
A. What Accounts for the Trend?
Several factors account for the tough-on-crime stance in environmental law. Environmental law violations are a subset of white-collar
crime, and therefore incarceration is more frequent as a result of the
national repugnance towards white-collar crime. The law is responding to public opinion polls demanding the incarceration of white-collar
criminals, particularly m the context of environmental law.
1. What Is White-Collar Crime?
Legal scholars do not agree on the defimtion of white-collar crime.
Some scholars define the term as "a crime committed by a person of
respectability and high social status in the course of his [or her] occupation."'9 7 Other socio-legal theorists flatly reject this defimtion.
They argue against making a distinction between street crime and
white-collar crime. They consider these defiitions meaningless and
"a lion's den from which no tracks return. '98 They argue that anyone
can embezzle, evade taxes or murder. More precisely, the status of
the individual committing the crime does not correlate to an offense.
Thus, some legal theorists consider any distinction between white-collar crime and street crime without merit. In short, there is no particular person nor crime that is exclusively white-collar.
Even though legal scholars disagree on the precise definition, there
is a vague public perception of what the term "white-collar" crime
means. This Article's purpose is not to define the term, but rather to
convey an understanding of how the term relates to sentencing m environmental law. For the most part, the term white-collar crime represents a stereotype to which the public and justice system react. The
stereotype includes assumptions about an offender's social status, education, employment and economic situation and drives the tough-oncrime movement.
96. See generally Stewart Macaulay, PopularLegal Culture: An Introduction, 98
M. Friedman, Law, Lawyers, and Popular Culture,
M. Trubek & John Esser, "CriticalEmpiricism" in
American Legal Studies: Paradox,Program, or Pandora'sBox?, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 3 (1989).
97. John Braithwaite, Challenging Just Deserts: Punishing the White-Collar
Criminals, 73 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 723, 724 (1982).
98. Travis Hirschs & Michael R. Gottfredson, The Significance of White-Collar
Crime For a General Theory of Crime, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 359, 362-63 (1989).
YALE L.J. 1545 (1989); Lawrence
98 YALE L.J. 1579 (1989); David
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2.

Factors That Explain The Crinmmalization Trend

Numerous events have combined to produce the societal hostility
toward white-collar crime. For instance, statistics support the belief
that certain white-collar offenses cost the commumty more money
than common crimes. 99 Additionally, continued production of mdustrial waste and pollution has sparked calls for holding producers accountable.1° Oil spills, securities trading manipulations, defense
procurement frauds and the collapse of many savings and loans are
high profile incidents that capture the public eye. Continual media
exposure increases the public awareness of and hostility toward those
who caused such calamities. 10 These incidents aided in producing the
negative public reaction to white-collar offenders.
The adverse attitude towards white-collar crime stems not only
from high profile incidents, but also from a belief that the legal system
rarely imposes jail sentences on these offenders. Many feel that those
of higher social class possess an unfair legal advantage which allows
them to avoid harsh legal pumshment."°s "There is a feeling in
America .
that the white-collar criminal is able to steal with the
pencil and get away with it. .. [However, a]n 18-year-old kid who
steals with the gun goes to prison for a long time.... There is something unfair... about that system, I think. We're going to change
it."' 0 3 The Guidelines address this incongruity by ensuring that prison
°4
sentences are meted out without regard to socio-economic status.
Despite the Guidelines' attempt to remedy the inequalities, the
public has lost faith in their country's ability to treat all citizens fairly.
Incarcerating a white-collar offender instills the sense of fairness and
equality that society feels is lacking. This exemplifies the public's wish
to fight economic imbalances between social classes, and relieve current social and economic problems. "Americans believe that 'the rich
99. Braithwaite, supra note 97, at 743.
100. Michele Kuruc, Comment, Putting Polluters in Jai" The Imposition of Criminal Sanctions on Corporate Defendants Under Environmental Statutes, 20 LA-ND &
WATER L. Rlv 93 (1985); Charles F Helsten & Lynn A. Williams, IndividualLiability for CorporateEnvironmentalViolations: An UnpleasantConsequence of Obtaining
Corporate Control, 2 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 97 (1989).
101. Gruner, supra note 26, at 13. See Elkan Abramowitz, White-Collar Crime:
From Wrist Slaps to Hard Time, N.Y. LI., Jan. 8, 1991, at 3 (discussing the S & L
scandals and public disgust for the greed of the 1980's).
102. See David Weisburd et al., Class, Status, and the Punishment of White-Collar
Criminals,15 LAW & Soc. INsuiRY 223, 224 (1990) (discussing findings that for the
same type of offense, those of higher social status were more likely to be imprisoned
than those of lower status).
103. Sentencing Rules Are Tough on White-Collar Crime, supra note 23, at 5F "A
person who mugs a city by polluting should receive at least as strong a pumshment as
the person who mugs an mdividual," states James M. Strock, the Environmental Pro-

tection Agency's criminal enforcement chief. Stipp, supra note 22, at 1.

104. See Sentencing Rules Are Tough on White-Collar Crime, supra note 23, at 5F
(statement of Commission Chairman and Federal Appeals Court Judge, William Wilkms, Jr.).
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get richer and the poor get pnson."' 105 The public wants to hold the
rich and poor equally accountable for their misdeeds. 0 6 The movement against white-collar crime is an attempt to reassert equal justice
for all.10 7

3.

Public Opinion Reflected in Polls

The justice system is beginning to put environmental offenders in
jail in response to a clear public support for jail terms. 08 Public pressure is "causing agencies to seek criminal enforcement when administrative or civil actions were previously deemed sufficient in similar
situations."'0 9 "Enforcement of criminal liability for environmental
[i]n response to . . growing public
crimes is on the rise .
pressure."" 0
Indeed, numerous public opinion polls show that popular support
exists for incarcerating white-collar offenders. For instance, some
polls find that the public ranks both pollution and worker safety offenses as equal to, or more serious than, robbery and certain violent
crmes."1 ' Articles discussing prison sentences for environmental offenders either state as fact that the public1 2supports prison sentences,
or cite a poll which reflects that support.
The following discusses only a small sample of the polls showing
public disdain for environmental offenders. A recent survey conducted by the Opinion Research Corporation found that "eighty-four
105. See Steven C. Bennett, Developments in the Movement Against Corporate

Crime, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV 871-72 (1990) (quoting F CULLEN ET AL., Coi,'oRATr
UNDER ArTACK:
THE FoRD PiNTo CASE AND BEYOND (1987)). See
Abramowitz, supra note 101, at 3 (discussion of public frustrations over the widening
gap between the rich and the poor).
106. John E. Stoner, Corporate Criminal Liabilityfor Homicide: Can the Criminal
Law Control CorporateBehavior?, 38 Sw. LJ.1275 (1985); Starr, supra note 23, at
900-02.
107 Bennett, supra note 105, at 873.
108. Abramowitz, supra note 101, at 3.
109. Fromm, supra note 52, at 823.
110. Morgan & Obermann, supra note 57, at 1199.
111. Judson W Starr, Countering Environmental Crimes, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AiF. L.
REv 379, 380 n.1 (1986); Braithwaite, supra note 87, at 732-38; F Henry Habicht II,
The FederalPerspective on EnvironmentalCriminalEnforcement: How To Remain on
the Civil Side, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,478, 10,485 (Dec. 1987); Criminal
Enforcement of Environmental Laws, supra note 86.
112. Michael L. Benson et al., Local Prosecutorsand CorporateCrime,36 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY LrrERAnruRE 356 (1990); Abramowitz, supra note 92, at 3; Gruner,
supra note 26, at 13; Starr, supra note 111, at 380 n.1; Ramsey I, supra note 27;
Rakoff, supra note 61, at 3; Weiss-Malik, supra note 23, at 386-87; Stoner, supra note
106; Habicht, supra note 111, at 10,485; Hedman, supra note 23; Steven L. Humphreys, Comment, An Enemy of the People: Prosecutingthe CorporatePolluteras a
Common Law Criminal,39 AM. U. L. REV. 311, 354 (1990); General Policy: Americans Say Environment Worsening, Greater Regulation Needed, Survey Says, 21 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 818 (Aug. 24, 1990); Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws,
supra note 86.
CRIME
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percent of Americans believe that damaging the environment is a serious crime." 113 Another survey stated that seventy-five percent of the
public favors holding executives personally liable for their company's
environmental offenses." 4 Correspondingly, about eighty percent of
the executives polled said that price fixing and insider trading are as
serious as environmental crimes."' A Department of Justice poll
found that the public ranks environmental offenses as the seventh
most severe type of crime, behind violent crimes such as murder. The
poll ranked environmental offenses as more serious than certain
white-collar offenses such as public corruption." 6
The legal system is therefore increasing the criminal prosecution of
environmental violators in response to the perception that the public
desires such action." 7 "In today's environment, there are new expectations of the American public that we have a responsibility to prosecute environmental crimes to the fullest extent possible," stated a
spokesperson for the Department of Justice." 8 Criminal prosecution
for the Exxon Valdez oil spill is an example of the government's response to public demands for justice." 9 The criminal statutes used
against Exxon require proof that it willfully or knowingly violated the
acts, even though "it stretches the imagination to even infer
' 20 that Exxon had the intent to willfully or knowingly spill the oil.'
The tough-on-crime stance developed because of current social and
political sentiment. Negative public response to recent white-collar
crimes and certain environmental disasters has created a social climate
that is decidedly "anti-offender". At the same time, our legal system
seems to be acutely aware of, and responsive to, public opinon. Accordingly, tis combination of the public's reactions and our legal system's response has created a substantial threat to future offenders.
B. Is This Threat Real?
This section examines whether prison sentences are merely
threatened, or whether environmental offenders are actually spending
113. Hotch, supra note 91, at 56.
114. David Stipp, Execs Get Little Sympathy For Crimes Against Nature, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 11, 1992, at B2 (referring to a survey conducted by Arthur D. Little Inc., a
Cambridge, Massachusetts consulting firm).
115. Id.
116. Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, supra note 87; see also Stipp,
supra note 114, at B2; Starr, supra note 111, at 380 n.1.
117. Hotch, supra note 91, at 56 (regulators assume the public favors increasing
crimnal prosecution of white-collar offenders).
118. Id.
119. Fromm, supra note 52, at 824. On the other hand, no criminal charges were
brought against any corporate officers, which exemplifies the limited use of criminal
sanctions. Robert W Adler & Charles Lord, Environmental Crimes: Raising the
Stakes, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REv 781, 784 (1991).
120. Fromm, supra note 52, at 824.
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time in jail.'' It will present sentencing statistics compiled by the
EPA, DOJ and various legal researchers. The section will also examine who the justice system is sending to jail and for what reasons.
The EPA and DOJ compiled federal sentencing statistics for environmental offenders. Unfortunately, exact statistical data on sentencing is unavailable because not all prosecuted cases or sentences are
published. 2 2 Comprehensive data is also not available for state envi-

ronmental criminal enforcement.

23

In the annual "Enforcement Accomplishments Report,"'2 4 the EPA
explains that ".. 53% of all referrals, 65% of all months sentenced,
and 68% of all penalties assessed have occurred during the last three
years."'" In 1991, the government prosecuted forty-eight criminal environmental cases, resulting in seventy-two convictions, forty-five of
which were against individuals and twenty-seven of which were
against organizations. 2 6 Although more environmental offenders are
being prosecuted, these statistics do not reflect the actual incarceration rate.
The following are some known statistics on the incarceration rate
for federal environmental offenders. In 1991, individuals were sentenced to 963 months (eighty years) of incarceration before suspen121. The statistics do not examine whether offenders from small compames are being sent to jail more than other criminals. One detailed American study concluded
that "those of higher status were more likely to receive an imprisonment sanction,
and when sentenced to prison, they were likely to receive longer prison terms than
comparable offenders of lower status." Weisburd et al., supra note 102, at 224.
122. See generally Abramowitz, supra note 101, at 3 (discussion of jail sentences
imposed on those involved m the S & L scandals); Braithwaite, supra note 97, at 747
(discussion of the impossibility of accessing statistics on the number of white-collar
crimes committed).
123. OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT, EPA, FY 1991 STATE-BY-STATE ENFORCEMENT
DATA SUMMARmES

3 (1992).

124. The following articles also list statistical data: Kafin & Port,supra note 84, at
20; Ramsey I, supra note 27; Enforcement: Stewart Reflects on DOJ's Status, Limits in
Environmental Enforcement Litigation, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1564 (Dec. 14, 1990);
CriminalEnforcement. 1990 Record Year for CriminalEnforcement of Environmental
Violators,JusticeAnnounces, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1397 (Nov. 23, 1990); see generally
Mark A. Cohen, Environmental Crime and Punishment Legal/Economic Theory and
EmpiricalEvidence on Enforcement of FederalEnvironmental Statutes, 82 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1054 (1992).

125. OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT, EPA, FY 1991 EPA ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT 3-3 (1992) [hereinafter FY 1991 EPA REPORT].
126. Environmental Enforcement Reaches Record Levels in Fiscal Year 1991, EPA
Press Release (Nov. 25,1991). Most of the 1991 criminal cases were prosecuted under
RCRA for violations of hazardous waste regulations and under the CWA for dumping waste into waterways or mumcipal sewer systems. The EPA reclaimed over $1.75
billion m civil penalties, private party cleanup commitments, and EPA cleanup cost
recoveries. Id. The Department of Justice released statistics indicating that between
1983 and 1989, 569 defendants were indicted, 165 were corporations and 404 were
individuals. Of the 432 convictions, 127 were corporations and 305 were individuals.
The government imposed a total of 270 years, 6 months, and 10 days of jail time.
Carol E. Dinkins, CriminalProsecutionof EnvironmentalViolations, C640 ALI-ABA
23 (Apr. 18, 1991).
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sion, and 610 months (fifty-one years) of incarceration after
suspension but before parole. 2 7 The average jail time was 8.5
months, based on seventy-two convictions and 610 months of courtordered jail time. Of course, these statistics do not reflect the amount
of time actually served. For violations of federal environmental statutes in 1991, courts suspended over thirty percent of all jail
sentences. 2 The actual average jail time per offender is probably less
than 8.5 months. Hence, one can conclude that jail sentences are becoming more common for environmental offenders, although the average jail sentence is less than a year.
Even as jail sentences become more common, they are not equally
distributed among large and small companies. One researcher found
that between 1984 and 1988, most federal criminal environmental
prosecutions of organizations involved small, closely held compames.' 2 9 Since 1984, only six percent of the corporations prosecuted
for federal criminal environmental violations were Fortune 500 compames. 130 The conviction rate for large and small compames was the
same; however, sentencing records differed greatly. Despite similar
violations, employees at large companies had an eighteen percent
chance of going to jail, compared to a forty-three percent chance for
employees of small companies.1 31 In other words, employees of
smaller companies are more likely to receive prison sentences than
those of larger companies. 32 Thus, an employee's likelihood of incarceration may depend upon the company's size. 3 3
Based on these statistics, one can conclude that jail time is more
likely to be meted out today than ten years ago. Nevertheless, since
the average sentence is fairly low in comparison to statutory and
Guideline maximums, and since courts are shying away from sending
employees of larger companies to jail, the threat may be more important than the actual punishment.
127. FY 1991 EPA REPORT, supra note 125, app. at 11. For more statistics and
sentencing mformation, see OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT, EPA, SUMMARY OF CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS RESULTING FROM ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS (1991); SUMMARY
MENT

1992, supra note 76; OFFICE

OF ENFORCEMENT,

EPA, FY 1990 EPA ENFORCE-

ACCOMPLSHMENTS REPORT (1991).

128. See generally Ramsey 1H, supra note 27 (discussion of the amount of suspended
sentences between 1982 and 1988).
129. Mark A. Cohen, an associate professor of management, conducted his research at Vanderbilt Umversity's Owen Graduate School of Management.
130. Gold, supra note 23, at B6; Adler & Lord, supra note 119, at 796.
131. Big corporations are defined as being large enough to be on the Standard &
Poor's Register, which requires 50 or more employees and annual sales of at least $1
million. Frank E. Allen, Few Big Firms Get Jail Time for Polluting,WALL ST. J., Dec.
9, 1991, at B1, B5.
132. Id. at B1.
133. Adler & Lord, supra note 110, at 795-97, 808-11 (providing a detailed statistical analysis of pnson sentences); Cohen, supra note 123, at 1073-75.
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Using Threats to Deter

Statistics suggest that the justice system uses the threat of jail to
deter offenders. "There is no question. . that even the idea of criminal enforcement has significant deterrent value."'"

In order to

"scare" the community into complying with environmental regulations, the legal system might publicize a large prison sentence rather
than increase the frequency of actual sentences Imposed.135 It is unclear whether these threats of imprisonment have deterred criminal
behavior. Even if the government has not strictly enforced criminal
laws, many suggest that jail threats will become real under the Guidelines. 36 "[J]udges now cannot impose a sentence only to suspend it m
favor of a period of probation.' 37 Whether prison will become a
more common sentence due to the Guidelines is an unanswered ques-

tion. Based on the present statistics, however, jail remains merely a
threat.

2. Some Explanations for the Statistics
What accounts for the limited use of jail sentences? It is arguable
that the judiciary is reluctant to incarcerate corporate offenders and

would rather impose fines to take advantage of a company's wealth. 38
Also, research shows that juries are lenient toward corporate offenders. 139 Legal scholars note inadequate funding as a major obstacle in
prosecuting white-collar offenses, including environmental violations, 4 ° while the justice system is directing the bulk of its resources
toward drug prosecutions. Commentators also state that poor cooperation between state and federal prosecutors, as well as a general lack
of expertise partially accounts for the low prosecution rate.' 4 '

134. Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, supra note 87, at 802 (statement of E. Dennis Muchnicki, Ohio Assistant Attorney General and Chief of the
Environmental Enforcement Section).
135. Ramsey II, supra note 27; Gaynor, supra note 22, at 28.
136. Sentencing Rules Are Tough on White-Collar Crime, supra note 23, at 5F (provides rationales for the courts' reluctance to impose prison sentences on corporate
offenders committing environmental offenses); Kafin & Port, supra note 84, at 20; see
generally Cohen, supra note 124; Kuruc, supra note 100, at 95.
137 Judson W Starr & Thomas I. Kelley, Environmental Crimes and the Sentencing Guidelines, NAT'L ENvTL. ENFORCEMENT J. 3, 3-4 (June 1990) (analysis of environmental criminal sentencing practices under the Guidelines), noted in Adler &
Lord, supra note 119, at 799 n.105 (1991).
138. Allen, supra note 131, at B1; Adler & Lord, supra note 119, at 797; Kuruc,
supra note 100, at 95; Humphreys, supra note 112, at 319 n.46.
139. Allen, supra note 131, at B1; Adler & Lord, supra note 119, at 797
140. A 1989 national survey of district attorneys concluded that a small minority of
local prosecutors prosecuted no more than three white-collar crimes per year. Barbara H. Doerr, Prosecuting CorporatePolluters: The Sparing Use of CriminalSanctions, 62 U. DET. L. REv 659, 665 (1985).
141. Benson et al., supra note 112, at 357-59.
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III.

PROBLEMS ASsocIATED WITH PRISON SENTENCES AND
ALTERNATIVES

The following section explores some of the problems associated
with prison sentencing. It examines what the sentencing objectives in
environmental law should be, and whether prison can achieve those
goals. In addition, the section questions whether prison can deter and

suggests that alternative sentences might be more appropriate for
some environmental offenders.
A. A Fierce Debate PrevailsAbout the Appropriatenessof Prison
Sentences
It is not surprising that while many are pushing to expand criminal
liability, others stand in opposition. Legal scholars differ over the
movement to prosecute offenders under lower culpability standards.
Additionally, some oppose prison because it is extremely costly, it can
damage one's reputation, deter socially desirable behavior and harshly
pumsh those who fail to follow complex laws and commit only minor

violations.
1. The Debate over a Lower Culpability Standard
Scholars argue over how to interpret the knowledge element found
in federal crimial environmental statutes.142 Most of the statutes require proof of knowledge for a conviction. The debate is over
whether or not prosecutors must prove knowledge for all elements of
the statute. According to some courts, knowledge is not necessary for
every element.' 43 Such holdings make the government's task of criminal prosecution easier.
Proponents for a lower standard assume that offenders did know or
should have known about the violations. "[I]t is naive to think that
every corporate official is unaware that his plant is violating an emissions standard."' 44 The government would be unable to convict corporate offenders if it were required to prove actual knowledge in
every case.1a5 Given the extensive publicity about criminal environ-

mental enforcement, offenders either had or should have had knowledge about any violation.
Those opposing the lower knowledge standard believe it is immoral
to imprison one who was unaware that he was committing a crime.
142. See supra notes 37-57 and accompanying text (discussion of the debate on the
"knowledge" element m criminal environmental statutes).

143. Id.
144. Kuruc, supra note 100, at 98.

145. Robert A. Milne, Note, The Mens Rea Requirements of the Federal Environmental Statutes: Strict CriminalLiability in SubstanceBut Not Form, 37 BuFF.L. REv

307, 319 (1988).
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Without proving intent, the system violates one's constitutional
right 146 to due process under the law.147
Typically, offenders do not deserve jail time if they lack the moral
culpability required for a criminal conviction. 48 The court must show
proof of fault before incarcerating an offender. Without such proof,
prison sanctions are unfair and unjust.'4 9 The system is placing more
concern on punishing and deterring offenders than on actually determining whether they deserve pumshment. 50 As stated by Professor
Hart in his framework on criminal law:
they squarely pose the question whether there can be any justification for condemning and punishing a human being as a criminal
when he has done nothing which is blameworthy. It is submitted
that there can be no moral justification for this, and that there is
not, indeed, even a rational, amoral justification. S
Opponents to the use of a lower standard of knowledge further argue that Congress did not intend to have an offender criminally convicted based upon a lower standard. Congress purposely included a
"knowledge" requirement in most criminal environmental
statutes.
1 52
Lowering the standard contravenes Congressional intent.
In addition, it is inappropriate to use the RCO doctrine under environmental statutes that include a knowledge requirement. The RCO
doctrine comes from strict liability public welfare statutes, such as the
FDCA. Those statutes are unlike environmental statutes because
they do not contain the same knowledge requirements.' 53 Therefore,
the RCO doctrine is contradictory to environmental statutes that do
require knowledge. 5 4
146. See Jonathan Weber, CorporateCrime of the '90s: Prosecutorsare Aiming for
the Boardroom in a Growing Push Against Polluters - Critics Argue They're Going
Overboard,L.A. TiMEs, Nov. 25, 1989, at 1 (debate about using easily obtained adrmstrative search warrants to gather evidence for a criminal prosecution, a practice
which is denied by others); see Paul G. Nittoly, Prosecutors'New Tacks in Environmental Cases, 125 N.J. L.J. 650 (1990) (discussion of constitutional concerns of using
civil discovery rules in criminal cases).
147 Weber, supra note 146, at 1; Nittoly, supra note 146, at 74.
148. Benjamin S. Sharp, Environmental Enforcement Excesses: Over-Criminalization and Too Severe Punishment,21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,658, 10,664-65
(Nov. 1991).
149. See Alan Saltzman, Strict CriminalLiability and the United States Constitution:
Substantive CriminalDue Process, 24 WAYNE L. REv 1571, 1572 (1978).
150. Sharp, supra note 148, at 10,660-65.
151. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMp.
PROBS. 401, 422 (1958).
152. Karen M. Hansen, "Knowing" Environmental Crimes, 16 WM. MrrcHELL L.
R-v 987, 1015-22 (1990).
153. See Hansen, supra note 152, at 997-1004, 1015-22 (discussion of other public
welfare statutes). Commentators note the irony in CAA's and CWA's criminal provisions which make reference to a "responsible corporate officer." Rakoff, supra note
61, at 3.
154. Rakoff, supra note 61, at 3; Ramsey I, supra note 27; Ramsey II, supra note 19;
Onsdorff & Mesnard, supra note 69, at 10,104-05.
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2. Prison Sanctions Questioned for Other Reasons
Some legal scholars believe that certain violations do not warrant a
prison sentence.' 55 Offenders, they argue, do not deserve imprisonment if they are merely uncooperative with environmental agencies,
are first-offenders, or have not harmed the environment. 5 6 Furthermore, offenders who commit techmcal violations, such as transporting
waste to an unpermitted facility, also do not deserve a jail sentence.
Those who are against prison state that jail may be an inappropriate
sentence for an upstanding citizen57who has no criminal record, but
who commits a job-related crime.1
Some state that jail is inappropriate for one who negligently fails to
follow complex and ever-changing laws. 8 This kind of standard is
unrealistic and too demanding. 5 9 The regulated commumty feels that
"criminal sanctions have been directed at conduct that is vaguely defined, and consequently, difficult to avoid." 60 "Any failure to comply
with any regulation is a misdemeanor, and I challenge anyone to be
100% in compliance with these laws," states one attorney.' 6' Because
of legal complexities, a negligent offender should not face a criminal
conviction.
Another argument stems from a sentiment that it is unfair to singleout businesses for criminal prosecutions since farmers and consumers
are some of the largest sources of pollution. 62 In fact, estimates show
that farmers and consumers generate over one-half of all solid and
hazardous waste. 6 3 Farmers and consumers, as with big business,
must learn to use cost-effective methods of disposing of waste. Hence,
the government should place greater emphasis on farmers and consumers as generators of large levels of waste.
Because imprisonment is such a severe sentence, the government
should use it selectively. Prison sentences could emotionally damage
offenders, rum their business reputations, or leave them financially
bankrupt.' 64 Due to the severe consequences, the legal system must
deliver prison sentences with great caution.
155. Sharp, supra note 148, at 10,662-65.
156. Others argue that given the nature of hazardous chemicals and pollution the
harm may not show up for years. The harm to the public and the environment is
difficult to detect immediately after an incident. Starr, supra note 111, at 383.
157. Gaynor, supra note 22, at 28-29.
158. The Justice Department has provided information on who is subject to crminal prosecution and how compames should conduct self-audits to avoid prosecution.

Businesses welcome the advice but believe that no company can meet the standard
for completing an effective audit. Lavelle, supra note 23, at 3.

159. Stipp, supra note 22, at 1.
160. Hotch, supra note 91, at 56.
161. Weber, supra note 146, at 1 (statement of Fred M. Blum of the San Francisco

law firm Jaffe, Trutamch, Scatena & Blum).
162. Cohen, supra note 124, at 1104.

163. Id. at 1104 n.168.

164. Gaynor, supra note 22, at 28.
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Scholars also contend that criminal sanctions may cause social harm
by deterring those engaged in socially desirable activities. 165 Environmental offenses, unlike street crimes, are often an outgrowth of "legitimate business activities.' ' 166 The justice system should not impose a
prison sentence on a well-intentioned company that engaged in eco-

nomically efficient conduct.'6 7 For example, a company engages in

socially desirable behavior if it transfers and disposes hazardous waste
m an economically efficient fashion. 6 8 If it does not have a permit,
the company has violated certain criminal environmental statutes and
is subject to criminal penalties. The criminal sanction deters socially
desirable conduct such as the disposition of hazardous waste in an economically efficient manner. Also, prosecution of a company may put
it out of business, and in turn, economically damage its employees and
community.1 6 9 Finally, criminal prosecution may make the company

ineligible for a permit or decrease the company's desire to continue in
that business. Thus, prison sentences may reduce the instances of socially desirable conduct.
Commentators state that both prison costs and problems with overcrowding must factor into the justice system's decision to administer a
prison sentence.' 70 Estimates show that the prison population will
triple by the end of this decade.' 7 ' The estimated annual cost of
prison construction to accommodate future inmates is $340 million to
$420 million. This does not include $170 million, which represents the
current annual cost of operating prisons, and which amounts to $22
thousand per inmate. 72 Staggering costs and limited space must factor into deciding whether to send an environmental offender to jail.
Given the high cost of imprisonment as well as the additional
problems associated with prison sanctions - the inappropriateness for
unknowing offenders and minor violations, the potential to deter socially desirable behavior, and the harshness of the sentence - it is prudent to explore other sentencing options, such as alternative or
intermediate sentences. Before considering such alternatives, one
must examine the sentencing goals of environmental law and the ability of imprisonment to achieve those goals.
165. Sharp, supra note 148, at 10,664-65; Cohen, supra note 124, at 1104.
166. Cohen, supra note 124, at 1104.
167 Stephen L. Humphreys, Possible Legal Challenges to Prosecution of Environmental Crime, 5 TLF L. Rep. (BNA) 295 (1990) (crimunal prosecution of
nonegregious violations will chill legitimate business decisions).
168. Sharp, supra note 148, at 10,664-65.
169. Braithwaite, supra note 97, at 729.
170. See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 7. Some judges may already be leery
about imposing a prison sentence on an environmental offender because many other
crimes warrant prison, and jail space is limited. Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, supra note 85.
171. FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, app. 1 at 19.
172. Id.
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B.

What are the Sentencing Objectives?

An exploration of environmental law sentences must first begin
with the purpose for the laws. The challenge is then to determine
what sentences can accomplish a desired goal. Many within the legal
system believe that prison is the best sentence to accomplish the primary goal of environmental law deterrence. The prime assumption,
however, is that prison can deter. But, what if it cannot? This section
questions whether prison can deter and whether the environmental
law field should acknowledge other sentencing objectives, such as education, prevention and rehabilitation. Section C considers whether
alternative sentences can accomplish those objectives.
Several years ago, compliance and cleanup, and not deterrence,
were the major objectives of environmental law enforcement. 173 Today, deterrence' 7 4 is the primary sentencing goal.' 75 The justice system bases this belief upon the assumption that industry is afraid of
incarceration and the subsequent damage it may do to its reputation.176 "Authorities are focusing on the business commumty's fear of
stigma of criminal status as a means of achieving
prison and the
1 77
compliance."'
Prison is furthermore taking the place of fines, which lawmakers
consider to be an ineffective deterrent. The belief is that companies
do not view fines as a pumshment, but rather as a cost of doing business, a cost they pass onto the consumer. 178 The expectation is that
prison will be perceived as punishment, and businesses will not be
able to transfer the "costs" of imprisonment, as they do fines, onto the
consumer. 79 While fines are commonly perceived as an acceptable
business occurrence, the hope is that the consumer will reject the convicted felon's company in the marketplace. 8 0
Opponents of imprisonment argue that the legal system relies too
heavily on prison sentences by assuming prison can change behav173. Ramsey I, supra note 27, at 273-77.
174. Gold, supra note 23, at B6; Stoner, supra note 106. Both unammously agree
that the state seeks deterrence m every criminal white-collar case.
175. The Environmental Crimes Unit has listed the following as legal objectives:
"(1) to afford an adequate deterrence against other potential misconduct and environ-

mental abuse; (2) to promote respect for this nation's environmental laws; (3) to seek
a just punishment of the offenders; and (4) to remove the competitive advantage and
economic incentive realized when a defendant disregards the requirements of the environmental statutes." Starr, supra note 111, at 381-82.

176. Kuruc, supra note 100, at 94-95.
177. Robert G. Morvillo, An Interview with District Attorney Morgenthau, N.Y.
L.J., Oct. 2, 1990, at 3; Kafin & Port, supra note 84, at 20.
178. Weiss-Malik, supra note 23, at 387; Criminal Enforcement of Environmental
Laws, supra note 87; Ramsey II, supra note 27, at 24; Lloyd W. Landreth, How the
Government Prosecutes Environmental Crime, FORT., Aug. 15, 1992, at 21.
179. Lavelle, supra note 23, at 3.

180. Landreth, supra note 178, at 21.
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ior.iai They doubt that people will automatically view noncompliance
as mmoral simply because the activity might result in a prison sentence. 18 Another problem with the assumption that prison can define
behavior as immoral depends in part on whether the regulated commumty thinks inpnsonment is likely to occur, an assumption which
may not be true.
Prison becomes a successful deterrent when the regulated community starts believing that noncompliance will result in a prison sentence. Deterrence becomes more questionable if many doubt the
likelihood of incarceration. The legal profession, in fact, has already
started questioning the infrequency of imprisonment. Legal scholars
criticize the justice system for not imposing more prison sentences.
They argue that mere threats without sentences nullify prison's deterrent effect.'8 3 Prosecutors agree that potential offenders will not obey
the law unless they see that violators spend time in jail."8 It is only a
matter of time before the regulated community learns what the legal
profession has already discovered, and prison's value as a deterrent
becomes greatly dinumshed.
If the goal is deterrence and prison sentences cannot deter, whether
because of nonuse or prison's innate inability to deter, one must consider other sentences. 85 More effective methods to reduce the production and improper disposal of environmental wastes may consist of
education, prevention and rehabilitation. 6
1. Education
Through education, the legal profession can increase public awareness about the need to protect and restore the environment. Education should include conveying the importance of protecting and
restoring the environment, along with the importance of creating and
implementing systems that generate less waste and prevent environmental damage.
The legal community should educate businesses as well as the major
waste producers, consumers and farmers. Once people understand
the significance of protecting the environment, there may be in turn
an incentive to develop less polluting production processes and prod181. Hedman, supra note 23, at 895.
182. Id. Offenders may internalize the moral position and refrain from taking action or possibly learn that they will be treated as morally reprehensible. Coffee, supra
note 82.
183. Kuruc, supra note 100, at 94; Doerr, supra note 140, at 668; Brian E. Concannon, Jr., Comment, CriminalSanctions for Environmental Crimes and the Knowledge
Requirement: United States v. Hayes International786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986), 25
AM. CRIm. L. RE-v 535, 537-38 (1988).
184. Benson et al., supra note 112, at 362.
185. Sharp, supra note 148, at 10,665.
186. Id.
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ucts.187 Informed citizens might also produce less waste or dispose of
waste more safely.
One must determine whether prison sentences should be the sole
form of deterrence. The success of prison's ability to frighten a potential violator into compliance depends on whether the wrongdoer
learns about the sentence. Also, if past offenders do not learn why
their previous actions were wrong or how to comply with the law and
produce less waste, they will be likely to continue their criminal behavior. Additionally, prison is a severe form of persuasion. Certain
offenses and offenders may not deserve such harsh "education."
Given these concerns about prison, the justice system has an obligation to look for less severe and more effective forms of education.
2. Rehabilitation
A rehabilitative sentence allows the justice system to do more than
punish offenders. For example, a sentence that forces the offender to
educate potential violators might assist in rehabilitating the offender
himself. By teaching others about their own infractions, an offender
might simultaneously learn how he can comply with environmental
regulation.
3. Prevention
The environmental law field should also consider how to prevent
the improper disposal and unnecessary production of waste. The
prospect of prison may frighten industry officials into compliance,
although other sentencing options such as educational and rehabilitative sentences might more effectively accomplish the goal of prevention. Also, deterrence is not the only vital sentencing goal in
environmental law and thus should not be singled out for consideration. Education, rehabilitation and prevention, in addition to being
important sentencing tools, are themselves goals worthy of attention.
C. Alternative Sentences
Because of the problems associated with prison and a determination of which goals prison can accomplish, the value of non-prison
sentences should be considered,"' 8 particularly when prison is not the
only criminal sanction available. Criminal law sanctions have become
synonymous with prison sentences. Many in the legal field assume
that incarceration is the best criminal sanction to punish and deter.
But other non-prison criminal sanctions are available and may actually punish and deter offenders more effectively than prison.
The following is a brief description of alternative or intermediate
sentences which originate from efforts to deter street crime. In Wis187 Cohen, supra note 124, at 1107

188. Hedman, supra note 23, at 895-99.
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consin, intermediate sanctions cost an average of $8,300 per of-

fender.

9

The offenders receive sentences customized for their

particular needs.' 9 0 Sanctions are intensive, highly structured, and
may include some form of incarceration. Intermediate sanctions can
include a period in jail, electromc monitoring, intensive supervision,

rehabilitative programs, commumty service and restitution.' 91 Hence,

the legal system can impose alternative sentences on criminal or noncriminal environmental offenders.
Intermediate sentences may effectively mitigate the cost of damages, restore and protect the environment and educate businesses,
consumers and farmers. Increasing the choice of sentencing options
to include alternative sentences ultimately increases the legal system's

chance of accomplishing its various objectives." 9

Although not exhaustive, the following is a suggested list of alternative sentences. 93 Sentences such as these may reach some of the
189. FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, app. 1 at 10.
190. Id. app. 3 at 21.
191. Id. app. 3 at 22.
192. Alternative sentences are fairly uncommon and may lack support from the
judiciary. See generally Donald W Stever, EnvironmentalPenaltiesand Environmental Trusts - Constraints on New Sources of Fundingfor EnvironmentalPreservation,
17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,356 (Sept. 1987); Cohen, supra note 124, at 108284.
193. These sentences were gathered from the following sources: State v. Bohnert,
22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,080 (Ohio Ct. C.P Hamilton County 1991)
(owner and operator of company sentenced to pay a fine, serve jail time, pay restitution, perform 1,000 hours of community service and become a member m good standing of the Sierra Club); Enforcement: Criminal Enforcement Action, No Longer
Limited to 'MidnightDumpers,' Lawyer Tells Conference, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2406
(1992) (company sentenced to pay a fine, give restitution to a state environmental
fund and to the city, placed on probation and voluntarily surrendered its hazardous
waste license); Criminal Enforcement: Nebraska, Manufacturer,Managers Sentenced
for Water Act Reporting, Monitoring Violations, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 520 (1989)
(company paid a penalty and was placed on a two year compliance schedule during
which the company was subject to unannounced inspections by the EPA and required
to place a public apology in the Omaha World Telegraph); Criminal Enforcement:
Court Sentences Criminal Storage Firm, Orders New Trial on Water Act, CERCLA
Counts, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2070 (1989) (corporation sentenced to a suspended
prison term, probation and ordered to perform an unspecified amount of community
service for the purpose of supporting conservation at Galveston Bay and increasing
the public understanding of the cleanup efforts surrounding Galveston Bay); Criminal
Enforcement: Bathroom Fixture Manufacturer Sentencedfor Illegally Dumping Waste
on Reservation, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1160 (1988) (company sentenced to probation,
ordered to perform an unstated number of community service hours, required to
place an apology in the local newspaper and create a system to properly dispose of
hazardous waste); CriminalEnforcement: Court Orders Sea Bright Official to Advertise His Guilt in Newspapers, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 614 (1988) (corporate official sentenced to a suspended jail sentence, probation and required to place a notice in
Cincinnati newspapers outlining his guilt in violating environmental laws); Enforcement: EPA Alleges GM Violated Clean Air Act, Seeks More Than $10 Million in Civil
Penalties,18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1264 (1987) (president fined, placed on probation and
ordered to give three lectures to professional organizations on the dangers of not
following hazardous waste laws); Enforcement Pennsylvania Waste Site Operator
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goals discussed above, but this Article does not offer any empirical
evidence.
1. Require defendants to purchase advertising space to publicize
their violations in a newspaper or other publication, to place a public apology m a publication and to run advertisements about the
importance of abiding by the laws that they violated.
2. Require chief executive officers to enter a plea m court.
3. Require defendants to assist m educating their particular industry or several other industries, as well as their community about
their violations, their guilt, the appropriate methods of compliance
and agencies which can provide information on environmental
protection.
ef4. Require defendants to assist m the cleanup and restoration
194
forts as a part of their community service and probation.
5. Require violators to create environmental trust funds or fund
research.
6. Require them to conduct research to find more cost effective sysless waste and more affordable means of dispostems of producing
195
ing of waste.
7. Require environmental audits to ensure that orgamzations or mdividuals do not repeat environmental law violations.
8. Require the defendant to perform free services or provide free
educational courses related to its industry.
9. Require a period of probation, through which the court could
watch the defendant to see whether he completes the alternative
sentence.
10. Require the defendant to do charitable community service work
related to or unrelated to his offense.
If one acknowledges the limitations on the use of incarceration, and
has an interest in objectives other than deterrence, one must consider
Jailed, Finedfor Violations of State Law, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2128 (1987) (company

required to enroll in county's accelerated rehabilitative disposition program, pay a
fine to a state environmental waste fund as restitution for damage to the environment,
pay for consultants to conduct environmental audits at five other printing companies
in the area and pay money to the Graphic Arts Association to educate the industry on
state waste disposal laws); Enforcement: Sentence for Wisconsin Printing Firm Requires Placement of Ad in Newspapers, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 832 (1986) (Wisconsin

printing company was ordered to pay for cleanup costs and place a newspaper advertisement warning the corporate community not to commit environmental crimes).
There exists a wealth of commentary on alternative sentencing. See, e.g., Doerr,
supra note 140, at 669-70; Kravcik and Materman, supra note 81; Cohen, supra note
124, at 1082; Dean M. Cordiano and Deborah J. Blood, Individual Liability for Environmental Law Violations, 64 CONN. BAR. J. 214 (1990); Bennett, supra note 105, at
884-90; see generally Adler & Lord, supra note 119; Priscilla J. Gottsch, Comment,

United States v. William Anderson, Co.. "Crime in the Suites" Alternative Sentencing of
CorporateDefendants, 16 CRGairrON L. RIv 1025 (1983); Paul G. Nittoly, Current
Trends in the Prosecution of Environmental Offenses, 5 Tomes L. Rep. (BNA) 161
(1990); Mary Beth Regan, Nature Police Get Tough but FaceHurdles, ORLANDO SEN.
TINEL, Nov. 4, 1990, at BI; Nittoly, supra note 137, at 74.

194. Sharp, supra note 148, at 10,663.

195. See generally Stever, supra note 192.
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other sanctions. Alternatives can deter offenders and accomplish
goals including education, rehabilitation and prevention m a cost-effective manner. This Article advocates conducting research to determine exactly how these sentences affect offenders before imposing
imprisonment or alternative sentences. It is to the legal system's advantage to have several sentencing options available.
IV.

STRUCrURE OF THE SURVEY AND

rrs FINDINGS

Although incarceration of environmental offenders remains uncom-

mon, the likelihood of criminal prosecution has become greater as recently enacted environmental laws subject more offenders to criminal
prosecution. This trend is m part a response to the perception that the
public wants the legal system to incarcerate more offenders. Even
though many appear to favor the use of prison sentences, others are
questioning the impnsonment trend because of the problems associated with prison and concerns over whether prison can accomplish the
goals of deterrence and rehabilitation. The list of possible alternative
sentences offered in tis section could provide solutions to some of
these problems.
Part IV examines the issues raised above in terms of how an informed member of the public might respond to recent trends in environmental law enforcement. It questions whether informed people
favor prison or imposing alternative sentences for environmental offenders. The issue is a significant one because the imprisonment trend
is a response, in part, to perceptions about public opinion. This section concludes by suggesting that the legal system should reevaluate
its current position on environmental law enforcement.
During the summer of 1992, a small group of Wisconsimtes participated in a survey that attempted to test whether the public favors
prison sentences for environmental offenders. 96 The question is pivotal if the incarceration trend is partially a response to the perception
that the public wants to imprison environmental offenders. Section A
presents the survey results. Section B is a brief explanation of the
survey methodology, provided to enable a better understanding of the
significance of the survey results. It includes the survey design and
provides a description of the offenses and the offenders. It also includes an explanation of the sentencing information provided after the
pre-test, and a listing of the pre-test and post-test sentence choices.
Section C explores more thoroughly the importance of considering
public opinion, particularly when perceptions about public opinion influence legal changes. Section D examines the significance of the survey findings. This section suggests that the legal system should
question the trend towards imprisonment for environmental offenders. Section E points out the need for further research.
196. See Survey, supra note 6.
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A. Survey Results
The bar graphs 97 and following discussion show how participants
changed their sentence choices between the pre-test and post-test.
Only half the participants chose prison during the pre-test and most
chose an alternative during the post-test. Overall, the survey shows
that informed participants favor alternative sentences over prison
sentences for certain environmental offenders.
Fourteen groups, totalling sixty-five participants, completed the survey The groups consisted of thirty-one males and thirty-four females.
The sample evenly represented all age and education levels.198 The
following graphs show the results of the pre-test and post-test. Figure
I indicates how many of the sixty-five participants chose prison during
the pre-test. Overall, about half the participants favored prison
sentences in all three cases. In Case One, more than half (thirty-nme)
chose prison for the corporate offender. In Cases Two and Three, less
than half favored prison for the environmental offenders (twentyseven and thirty, respectively).
Figure 1 also reveals how many of the sixty-five participants chose
prison during the post-test. In all three cases, a significantly smaller
number of participants chose prison during the post-test than in the
pre-test. In Case One, the number who chose prison dropped from
thirty-nine to twenty-four, in Case Two the number fell from twentyseven to thirteen, and for Case Three the number who chose prison
decreased from thirty to fourteen.
Figure 2 reports the number of participants, out of sixty-five, who
selected an alternative sentence during the post-test. Most participants chose the alternative sentence during the post-test: forty-seven
in Case One, fifty-eight in Case Two, and fifty-one in Case Three.
Participants had the option during the post-test of choosing prison
in addition to an alternative sentence. Figure 3 shows the majority of
participants who chose an alternative sentence, and did not select
prison either: thirty-four m Case One, forty-nme in Case Two, and
forty-three in Case Three.
Figure 4 shows how many of the sixty-five participants switched
from choosing prison during the pre-test to choosing alternative sentencing during the post-test period. A quarter of the participants
switched entirely from prison to another sentence between the pretest and post-test: sixteen in Case One, sixteen in Case Two, and
eighteen in Case Three.
In sum, Figures I and 2 contain the most significant findings. Figure
1 shows that fewer participants than expected chose prison during the
197. See infra figs. 1-4.
198. The demographics are as follows: Gender - Female = 31, Male = 34; Age - 20
to 30 = 18, 31 to 40 = 19, 41 and above = 28; Education - Little or no college = 26,

College degree = 39.
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pre-test, and that the number who chose prison dropped even further
during the post-test. Figure 2 shows that most participants favored
alternatives to prison during the post-test. The results indicate that
half the participants favored prison in the pre-test, but most favored
alternative sentencing arrangements during the post-test.
B.

Organizationand Structure of the Survey
1.

Survey Format

The following is a brief description of how the survey was conducted. Participants took the survey in groups of two or more people,
and received the same three cases during the pre-test 19 9 and the posttest."° An informational discussion took place between the two
tests. 20 ' These three cases, entitled Case One, Case Two and Case
Three, contained case facts and personal information on the defendants, sentencing options and space for the participants to explain their
sentence choices for each case.
The purpose of the survey was to determine how members of the
public, having knowledge of the details of the alleged crime, would
sentence environmental offenders in a real case. To achieve this result, the hypothetical included specific facts and allowed the participants to choose a sentence based upon their understanding of what
happened in each case.
2.

Offenses

The survey cases included two environmental offenses and one corporate fraud offense in order to test the assumption that the public
favors imprisonment for environmental offenses over general whitecollar offenses. As the imprisonment trend in environmental law is
part of a larger trend toward imprisonment for white-collar criminals,
the responses to the corporate fraud offense provide insight into how
the public would sentence other types of stereotypical white-collar
criminals, not just environmental law offenders.
The survey cases were patterned after real cases in which the justice
system incarcerated an offender for behavior recently defined as criminal. The hypotheticals were designed to gauge public reaction to
cases involving harm and whether or not defendants' knowledge
played a role in sentencing. The offenses included environmental contammation without harm, and violations prosecuted under a lower
"knowledge/standard" than is found in criminal environmental
statutes.
The survey cases were the result of an extensive search to find two
real environmental cases that resulted in a prison sentence based upon
199. See infra app. (pre-test cases).
200. Id. (post-test cases).
201. Id. (information sheet).
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FIGURE 1

Prison Selections:
Pro-Test v. Post-Test
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environmental contamination, and not harm, and/or where the defendant's knowledge of the violation was in question, and a real corporate fraud offense that resulted in a prison sentence, even though
the offender lacked knowledge of the violation. The survey excluded
criminal convictions based on egregious facts, such as an intentional
dumping of pollutants into a river which resulted in harm to the
environment.
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FIGURE 2

'Chose Alternative Post-Test
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Offenders

In order to make the offenders appear realistic, the survey cases
included facts about the offender's current employment situation, financial situation and personal life. The cases also included mformation concerning whether his or her company was still in business, and
if so, its economic situation, as well as whether this was the defendant's first offense.
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FIGURE 3
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The survey also included facts which made the offender fit the profile of a stereotypical white-collar offender. For example, the participants were told whether the offender had a college degree or was the
president of a company employing thirty or more people.
The defendant m Case One founded his company. In Case Two, the
defendant and his company, which employed thirty people, were in
extreme financial debt. In Case Three, the offender was a Korean
War veteran and former head of a Chamber of Commerce, and the
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FIGURE 4

Switched Away From Prison
Pre-Test to Post-Test
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offender's company, which employed 300 people, had gone out of
business.
4. Information on Sentencing Issues
The survey provided information on the sentencing issues as well as
on the offense and offender. After the pre-test, participants received
a two-page handout containing information on sentencing. After par-

1993] SENTENCING TRENDS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 81
ticipants received this information, they engaged in a discussion which
allowed them to learn about sentencing issues.
The information sheet contained statistical data on prison costs and
problems with overcrowding, as well as the costs of alternative
sentences. The discussion focused on how farmers and consumers
produce the most pollutants, what goals environmental laws should
accomplish, whether prison can accomplish the desired goals cost effectively, and whether the legal system should incarcerate unknowing
violators.
The survey tested whether participants would incarcerate various
types of offenders or whether they would prefer an alternative sentence after they understood more about the offense, the offender,
prison costs and sentencing objectives. The information session
helped the participants make an informed choice about specific types
of cases and offenders. The hope was that participants would choose
a sentence based on their understanding of both the case and the
sentences.
5. Sentence Choices: Pre-Test and Post-Test
During the pre-test, participants were given a choice of probation,
fines and three traditional sentences. But, during the post-test, participants could choose a sentence from an expanded list of sentences
that included: court-supervised work, prison, strict or regular probation, house arrest and fines.
In each case, the alternative sentence was a court-supervised work
sentence designed specifically for each particular offense and offender. The sentence was designed to be less expensive than prison
and to act as a general and specific deterrent, a rehabilitative and educational tool and a method of retaining socially desirable behavior.
The sentence required the offender to perform tasks related to hIs/her
offense, such as placing advertisements in newspapers about his offense and lecturing businesses about her sentence and advice on how
to comply with environmental laws. All three cases contained a different court-supervised work sentence.
6. Reasons for Using a Pre-Test and Post-Test
The survey compared participant's pre-test and post-test choices to
determine what choices participants made after they read and discussed sentencing information. Post-test participants learned more
about sentencing than did participants in the pre-test. Changes in sentencing patterns suggest that the information and additional sentence
choices affected how participants sentenced.
The survey compared the pre-test results with other polls' results to
determine whether the facts about the offense and offender affected
sentence choices. Unlike the post-test participants, the pre-test par-
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ticipants did not have the additional sentence choices and sentencing
information. The survey compared the pre-test results with other
polls to determine whether facts about the offense and offender influenced whether participants chose prison.
This survey used a format similar to recent surveys in Alabama and
Delaware, which considered whether participants favor prison
sentences or would favor alternative sentences for a wider array of
offenses.202 The surveys told participants about sentencing issues and
provided alternative sentences during the post-test. The surveys revealed that informed participants favor alternative sentences for nonviolent crimes.
In sum, the survey tried to determine how members of the public
would sentence offenders once they know who, what and why they
were sentencing. The point was to compare the pre-test and post-test
results to determine whether informed participants make different
sentencing choices from uninformed participants and what those
choices were. The survey also compared the pre-test responses to
other polls to determine whether providing extra facts about the offense and offender had any influence on participants' choices.
C. Questions About Public Opinion
It is necessary to question the justice system's perception that the
public wants more environmental offenders imprisoned because this
perception has influenced sentencing policies in environmental law.
As an initial matter, the legal system should be cautious about relying
on its perceptions of public opinion because "public opinion" is chimerical. The legal profession should be skeptical about using poll results to determine public opinion as polls can yield misleading results.
However, this survey's format cures many inaccuracies found in public
polls, and may be an alternative tool to understanding the public's
preferences in sentencing environmental offenders.
1. No True Public Opinion
The danger in relying on public interest to design sentences lies in
the difficulty in truly understanding the public's desires.2"' "Public
opinion" is a misleading concept because it implies that there is an
actual consensus. Given the multitude of citizens and the potential
202. FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, app. at 14-23.
203. For instance, the legal system may pass a law because judges, politicians, attorneys, interest groups, etc. have successfully manipulated public opinion in their favor.
These groups or a single group may use continual media coverage to present their side
of an issue. Eventually, members of the public accept the "slanted" information as
fact and accept the opinion offered as their own. The manipulation is a success when
citizens repeat the learned opinion and demand that the legal system respond to their
"interests." This is one possible scenario on how groups can mold opinion and influence legal change. See generally Macaulay, supra note 96; Friedman, supra note 96;
Trubek & Esser, supra note 96.
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opinion, it is unlikely that true public
diversity between each 2person's
°4
opinion can ever exist.
An appearance of public opinion may, m fact, inaccurately reflect
the general public's opinion. It may magnify the views of a small percentage of the population, such as interest groups or lobbyists, and
take them to be representative of the general public's opimon on a
particular topic. The legitimate opinion of the public at large may not
accurately be disclosed.2 05
2. Problems with Polls
Polls may also be mampulated to justify or reinforce legal changes.
For example, polls may be designed to infer that the public wants to
incarcerate environmental offenders. Tins practice presents problems
because a poll may provide the participant with incomplete information and elicit responses which do not adequately reflect how the participant would actually sentence an offender. The following two
paragraphs explain the difficulty in more detail.
First, some polls determine public opinion by asking participants
whether they believe certain environmental offenses are "serious," or
by questioning them on how they would rankthe severity of such offenses. The problem is that "serious" is a vague term that does not
always correlate with desirability of incarceration. However, if the
participant thinks a crime is "serious" or ranks a crime as severe, the
poll might conclude that the public favors incarceration. "Serious"
may mean four years of jail to one individual, but only 1,000 hours of
commumty service to another.
Participants' explanations in tis survey reinforce this discrepancy.
Some stated that they favored a harsh sentence, but umposed only a
light fine or three years of probation. Others wanted a light sentence,
but chose two years in prison and a large fine. Hence, if someone
thinks an offense is "serious" or "severe," that does not mean they
favor incarceration. It is therefore dangerous to rely on polls that use
vague questions to define public opinion.
Second, other polls specifically ask participants to impose
sentences, and neglect to provide information about the offense or
offender. The poll forces the participant to create his own impression
about whom he is sentencing. Without specific facts, the offender becomes a vague, one-dimensional abstraction. Poll participants may
visualize offenders like those in the Savings & Loan scandals or the
Exxon Valdez oil spill. Therefore, it may be that participants who offer their opinions on how they would sentence an abstract person may
base the opinion on those who represent the most egregious and wellknown environmental offenders.
204. Id
205. Id.
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These polls merely produce opinions about a stereotype and do not
take a participant's understanding of sentencing issues into account.
Those opinions do not reflect how citizens would sentence an actual
offender once they understood more about sentencing costs, purposes
and alternative sanctions. "While people might be in favor of directing fire and thunder at white-collar crimmals in the abstract, when
confronted20 6 with a remorseful businessman

.

.

.

condemnation

mellows.

Hence, one must be skeptical about the results of polls. Given their
format, the polls might not reflect how a person with more information would sentence an offender. And given more information, participants may impose different sentences. This survey reinforces this
conclusion.
3. Survey Format
Unlike other polls with differing formats, this survey did not find
that the public overwhelmingly favors incarcerating environmental offenders. While some polls ask vague questions about abstract offenders, this survey provided participants with literal information about
the offense, offender and sentencing. The results of polls that do not
provide such information might not accurately reflect how a participant would actually sentence an offender.
In all fairness, this survey does not reproduce public opinion, nor
could it. Instead, the survey tries to provide participants with more
information so that its results will more truly reflect the public's preferred sentences in specific cases. This effort is an attempt to avoid
reproducing typical stereotypes about environmental offenders.
Because polls may represent opinions regarding only the most egregious offender and not include information on sentencing, the justice
system should be skeptical about using them to create sentencing policies. This survey shows that participants who are informed will make
different sentencing choices than those who are uninformed. The contradictory results between this and other polls reveal, at a minmum,
the difficulty in determining how members of the public would sentence certain offenders. Thus, when creating enforcement policies for
environmental offenders, the justice system should not rely solely on
its own perceptions about public opinion.
D. Findings
Participants informed about sentencing favor alternative sentences
for certain environmental offenders. This conclusion was reinforced
by the pre-test, which found that participants informed about the offense and offender will not overwhelmingly favor prison. This section
reveals the significance of the survey's findings, and looks at the rea206. Braithwaite, supra note 97, at 738.
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sons participants gave for making their sentencing decisions. It exammes why participants did or did not chose prison during the pre-test,
and why some chose prison m the pre-test only to switch to an alternative in the post-test. This Article concludes that the justice system
should reconsider whether to continue subjecting more environmental
offenders to jail. This suggestion is made under the assumption that
informed participants would favor alternative sentences, largely because of the problems associated with prison and the availability of
alternative sentencing options.
1. Additional Sentencing Information
Between the pre-test and post-test, the participants' choices
changed in response to both the sentencing information and expanded
sentencing choices provided. While half of the participants favored
prison in the pre-test, most favored alternatives during the post-test.
The change occurred because the sentencing options and information
had by pre-test participants differed from that used during the posttest. Therefore, the results show that when participants are more mformed about sentencing, they will favor alternative sentences for certan environmental and corporate fraud offenses.
2. Findings-Specific Offenses and Offenders
One purpose of the pre-test was to compare its results to those of
other polls. The pre-test revealed that even without the additional
sentencing information and sentencing choices provided in the posttest, a significant number of participants would not select prison. The
results differ from other polls that state that the public overwhelmingly favors prison sentences for environmental offenders. This suggests that a participant's sentence choice might change if he believes
he is sentencing a "real" person, and knows some facts about the case.
Information on the offense and offender would influence a participant's decision not to choose prison.
3.

Findings-Written Explanations

Participants' explanations provide insight into precisely why they
chose certain sentences durng the pre-test and post-test. The explanations for choosing prison parallel the expected rationale, that prison
can punish and deter. Those who favored alternative sentences expressed concern that prison is harsher than necessary for unknowing
violators and first-offenders, overly expensive, and unsuccessful as a
deterrent. The pollsters turned to the alternative sentences not only
in response to these apprehensions, but also because they felt that in
terms of cost effectiveness, an alternative could accomplish at least as
much as a prison sentence. The explanations, particularly from the
post-test, exemplify how informed citizens support the use of punish-
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ments other than prison. They blatantly contradict the assumption
that citizens hope to imprison environmental offenders.
a. Why ParticipantsDid and Did Not Select Prison in the Pre-Test
The participants' explanations for choosing prison in the pre-test
are in keeping with the commonly stated reasons for incarcerating offenders. The following is a general list extracted from participants'
written responses. First, participants favored prison because they felt
the sentence could punish offenders and teach future violators to comply with laws. Second, some stated that environmental offenders deserve prison sanctions because the justice system should treat all
offenders equally. For example, knowingly committing corporate
fraud and burglarizmg someone's home are equivalent crimes that
both deserve imprisonment. Third, some stated that because environmental harm is difficult to detect, violations warrant prison sentences.
Fourth, some felt that a corporate officer must be held accountable for
company violations, regardless of his personal knowledge. Prison was
his punishment for failing to prevent or detect the violation. An educated offender should be under a higher duty to ensure that his company does not violate the law, and prison is a severe enough sentence
to ensure that compliance. Even though participants expressed their
reserve in criminally prosecuting unknowing offenders, most did not
truly believe that the officer possessed no knowledge. They thought
that given the complexities of a business organization, an officer could
obfuscate his involvement and appear to have no knowledge. Fifth,
some felt the justice system should make an example out of an offender to scare other offenders into compliance.
While the above explanations represent the standard reasons cited
for incarcerating white-collar offenders, only half the participants expressed these views. Many did not select prison after receiving additional facts about the offender and the offense. Others did not think
that first-offenders or those who lost their jobs or were financially
devastated deserved jail sentences. Still others did not want to imprison someone who may have contamnated, but not harmed the environment, or who did not personally profit from his actions. In
addition, participants felt that due to an organization's complexity, the
continual changes in the law, and the concern over sending a morally
blameless offender to jail, prison was inappropriate for unknowing offenders. Even some who thought the offender really knew or should
have known of the consequences of hIs actions nonetheless chose an
alternative sentence because they felt that probation or a fine was a
better punishment and deterrent. Hence, the additional facts provided steered participants away from imposing prison sentences.
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b.

Why ParticipantsDid Not Favor PrisonDuring the Post-Test

Participants did not like prison sentences because the expense outweighed the value. Most lost faith in prison's ability to punish and
deter, and felt that other sentences could accomplish those goals in a
more effective and less costly fashion. They thought prison was a luxury whose cost the defendant should incur as rent. They were against
having society bear the cost of the offender's sentence. They felt that
taxpayers who pay for sentences will expect something positive in return for the expense. Since it is thought that prison does not produce
anything positive, it follows that society would benefit by keeping offenders out of jail.
Participants did repeat some of the reasons given in the pre-test for
not choosing prison. Most viewed nonegregious or nonviolent offenses as not serious enough to warrant incarceration. Participants
felt that prison was too harsh for unknowing offenders who are morally blameless. Also, participants did not want to incarcerate certain
offenders merely because of their personal circumstances. They felt
that first-offenders and those who suffered extreme financial hardship
or loss of employment did not deserve incarceration.
Further, participants did not agree with imprisoning an offender as
a scapegoat for another's wrongs. They were uncomfortable with using an offender as an example to others, if the offense did not warrant
as harsh a sentence. They wanted to sentence an offender according
to that person's actions, and not in response to the actions of past or
future wrongdoers.
c. Why ParticipantsFavored Alternative Sentences
Participants viewed alternative sentences as a solution to the
problems associated with prison. The following is a list of reasons why
the alternative sentences were chosen, and such reasons should be
viewed in combination with all others.
1. Alternative sentences were less costly than prison, and would result in taxpayers mcurring less expense.
2. The sentence was less harsh than prison, and therefore more appropriate for first-offenders, techmcal violators, unknowing offenders, and environmental contaminators.
3. An offender could maintain a job, continue as a productive member of the community, and avoid becoming a financial burden to
society.
4. Keeping the offender employed at a company that needs the offender for its vitality helps both the individual business and the financial situation of the community as a whole.
5. The sentence could assist in reaching goals such as education and
deterrence. The offender could educate businesses, consumers and
farmers through publicity, lectures, or offender-funded education
programs. The offender or others could discuss topics including the
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actual violation, compliance with the laws, the appropriate agencies
to contact to inquire about compliance, the sentences that a particular violation may carry, and the importance of protecting the environment, generating less hazardous waste and creating processes
that produce less waste.2 °7
6. Education might deter the public from violating laws or from improperly disposing of or generating hazardous wastes. Members of
the public might comply with laws and properly dispose of waste
after learning of the importance of protecting the environment and
producing less pollution.
7 Education could teach consumers and farmers both proper waste
disposition and responsible management of the environment.
8. Education could induce the public to create systems that generate less waste.
9. Ultimately, the offender might learn something valuable from
the completion of his sentence.
Hence, participants felt that alternatives were cost effective, and
might punish and deter better than prison and produce something
positive for both society and the offender. They viewed a combination of the post-test sanctions-court supervised work, probation,
fines2 08 or house arrest-as equally if not more effective than prison.
These sanctions were less expensive and could punish and deter better
than prison, and could accomplish further objectives as well. The
combination of these sanctions might place a heavier burden on the
offender, and therefore serve as a greater punishment and deterrent.
While almost all participants selected alternative sentences, prison
nonetheless remained an important sentencing tool. Many felt that
under different circumstances, prison would represent their first
choice. Some said they would impose a jail sentence on someone who
intentionally violated the law, damaged the environment, or took
money from innocent shareholders. However, one should not use
these results to guess when participants would favor prison.
207 It is noteworthy that some participants were skeptical about publicizing the
name of the offender or the company. The concern stemmed from a fear that personal publicity could damage the person's or company's reputation. For the same
reason, some participants did not favor prison.
208. Participants wrote a monetary sum for each offense. The cases provided some
statutory guidelines, but they were informed that they could raise or lower that level.
The participants were specifically told that they were fining the individual offender
and not the corporation. The following summarizes what fines participants chose during the survey:
Pre-Test
Case One
Case Two
Case Three

28/56
28/53
18/53
32/59
18/59

=
=
=
=
=

$1 mil.
$50K $10K $50K $5K

- $100K
$25K
$5K
$25K

Post-Test
20/53 = $1 nil. - $100K
14/41
14/41
24/51
14/51

=
=
=
=

$50K - $25K
$10K - $5K
$50K - $25K
$5K
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In sum, the explanations show that once participants are informed
about the context of the crime, they may favor the use of sanctions
other than prison. This finding contradicts the popular belief that citizens want only prison sentences for environmental offenders. Even
during the pre-test, participants did not favor prison sentences. The
explanations reinforce the conclusion that informed participants
would like to see the justice system consider sentences other than
prison for certain environmental offenders.
a. Informed ParticipantsDid Not Favor Subjecting More Offenders
to Incarceration
The results show that informed participants do not agree with specific legal changes in environmental law. Participants did not favor
imposing prison sentences upon certain behavior that had only recently been defined as criminal. Also, participants opposed the rigidity of the Sentencing Guidelines by preferring flexibility in sentencing
by allowing for the consideration of an offender's background. Accordingly, three state surveys have similarly revealed that informed
citizens do not favor subjecting certain offenders to incarceration.
If the justice system is expanding the scope of criminal liability
based upon the perception that it is giving the public what it thinks the
public wants, and the public does not in fact want these expansions,
one should contemplate whether the justice system should continue
focusing upon punishment and deterrence linked to threats of mcarceration. The findings specifically show that the participants did not
agree with recent legal changes which subject more offenders to incarceration. This Article considers how to design sentences, and questions whether it is prudent for the legislators to continue designing
sentences based on their current emphasis on imprisonment.
b.

The Survey Results Raise Questions About the Imprisonment
Trend

If the criminal justice system truly wants to placate the public, and
understands that informed citizens will prefer sentences different from
those of uninformed citizens, it must determine which audience it
wants to appease. The justice system can either leave the public uninformed, thereby giving it the freedom to increase criminal convictions,
or, it can choose to educate the public. If after providing education,
the system discovers that informed citizens do not want incarceration,
it must then determine whether the results should influence its policy
of criminally prosecuting more offenders. The justice system does not
need public support for all legal changes, but the results do raise an
interesting question. Should the system take the simpler route by
leaving citizens uninformed, proceed under the perception that the
public favors prison and continue to criminally convict more offenders? Or, should it attempt to educate the public about sentencing, and
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face the possibility that the public might want alternatives other than
prison sentences?
c. Questioningthe Imprisonment Trend as a Trend
Although this Article debates the tough-on-crime stance in response to the survey, it also questions the Imprisonment trend in
terms of the prudence of a whole system designing sentences in response to one philosophy. The justice system is so focused on prison,
punishment and deterrence that it could overlook other sentences and
goals, including intermediate sanctions or rehabilitation. The current
system must consider all possible sentences and objectives. The field
of environmental law might benefit as well from considering sentencing options and objectives other than prison, deterrence and
punishment.
This Article examines whether environmental law should subject
more offenders to the threat of incarceration. Because of the
problems associated with prison and the concern over whether prison
can deter, one should question its increased use. One must also be
aware of the danger in writing all laws in response to one set of ideologies. Doing so leaves the system with no room to incorporate other
worthwhile sanctions and objectives.
E. More Research
The need exists for further research to retest the findings of this and
the other two state surveys. The Wisconsin-based survey included
only three types of offenses. Other surveys could contain a larger participant sample size and geographic scope, more types of offenses and
offenders, more case information, more alternative sentence choices,
and more sentence choices during the pre-test. The results of such
surveys might provide greater insight into what types of sentences informed citizens want.
The research must go beyond determining how the public wants to
sentence various offenders. One should conduct research to determine the impact a sentence will have upon various offenders and design sentences based upon that research. 0 9 To determine the impact
of a sentence, one should directly observe the effect a sentence has on
an offender. The system must grant those people who have direct experience with sentencing the authority to advise on the construction of
sentences.
CONCLUSION

Prosecuters are now attempting to subject more offenders to crimunal prosecution and liability. Over the past decade prosecutors have
209. Dickey, supra note 2.

1993] SENTENCING TRENDS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 91
placed greater reliance on criminal rather than civil or admimstrative
laws. A larger umbrella of environmental behavior is subject to criminal liability due to expanded defimtions of environmental crimes as
seen under the Guidelines, cases and interpretations of environmental
statutes. Due to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, most criminal environmental offenders face mandatory jail sentences. Also, risks of
incarceration are greater because the justice system is aggressively
prosecuting environmental offenders.
The reliance on imprisonment parallels the national imprisonment
trend. The dominant objectives of the national pro-prison trend are
punishment and deterrence. Prison is viewed as the best punishment
and deterrent. Public opinion influences this trend because the legal
system believes that the public expects the system to incarcerate more
crimmals. The trend is similar m the field of environmental law. The
justice system thinks that prison can accomplish the leading sentencmg aims, which include punishment and deterrence. The justice system is increasing criminal prosecutions partially in response to the
perception that the public wants to imprison environmental offenders.
The entire legal profession, including the field of environmental
law, must struggle with the problems associated with incarcerating
more offenders. Due to the imprisonment trend, the legal system
faces overwhelming prison costs, prison overcrowding, problems with
deterrence and a lack of emphasis on goals such as rehabilitation. The
law enforcement system must address the following concerns:
whether prison is the most appropriate sentence for all offenders,
whether the sentence is too harsh, particularly for unintentional and
nonegregious behavior, whether prison deters socially undesirable behavior, whether prison or the threat of prison can deter, whether the
field should focus on other goals such as education, and whether other
less expensive sentences can achieve the desired goals.
Prosecutors should also question, as many have with street crimes,
the effectiveness of placing so much emphasis on the criminal conviction and incarceration of more offenders. In an attempt to solve some
of the problems associated with prison, the justice system is creating
and employing alternative sentences for street crimes. Prosecutors
should call for alternative sentences to solve some of the problems
associated with imprisoning environmental offenders, particularly
when the sentences might be a more cost-effective means to punish
and deter as well as to educate and rehabilitate.
Given the above problems with the imprisonment trend, one must
question whether the public favors prison or other alternatives. It is
important to examine the public's perspective on the current sentencmg philosophies because the imprisonment trend is due in part to the
justice system's response to public demands for incarceration. Tlus
Article used a survey to determine how the public would respond to
recent legal changes, the problems associated with prison and the use
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of alternative sentences. To determine how an informed citizen would
respond to the above questions, tis survey used a format different
from most other polls. The survey provided participants with information about the offense, the offender and sentencing. By providing
this information, the survey more accurately showed how informed
citizens would sentence a "real life" environmental offender. Other
polls do not provide this extra information. Instead, they run the risk
of reflecting opinions regarding the most egregious of the offenders.
Hence, this survey better determines what sentences informed participants favor.
The results show that when a person understands more about sentencing issues and alternative sentences he/she do not agree with subjecting more environmental offenders to jail, and would prefer
alternative sentences. Informed members of the public do not favor
prison sentences and do favor alternative sentences for nonegregious
and unintentional environmental violators. The results contradict the
current direction of environmental law enforcement.
The environmental law field must also question whether or not it
should follow the national imprisonment trend and increase criminal
convictions and prison sentences. The trend is questionable due to the
following: the problems associated with prison, the results of this survey which show that informed participants do not favor prison and the
inherent problems with designing all sentences according to the philosophies of one trend. In short, this Article urges that greater scrutiny be given to the current sentencing practices.
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APPENDIX

A. Pre-Test
Case One
FACTS
Mr. Roland Blake was the president and the chief executive officer
of Compusoft, a publicly held software company in Dallas, Texas, that
employed approximately 800 people. Mr. Blake and another employees were charged with violating federal securities laws. This case concerns Mr. Blake.
Mr. Blake founded Compusoft in 1968. He has a college degree
and a master's degree in Industrial Engineering.
For approximately a year and a half, Mr. Blake and other company
employees conspired to defraud shareholders by issuing financial
statements which overstated the company's revenues and profits by
40%.
This was Mr. Blake's first offense. Mr. Blake did not make any
money from his securities activities.
CONVICTION*
The defendant was found guilty of violating federal securities laws.
According to the statute, a violator shall be imprisoned between
twenty-one and thirty-six months and fined not more than $1,000,000,
or both.
SENTENCE
Circle the sentence you feel is appropriate. You may select more
than one. Acting as a judge, you may increase or decrease the prison
length and fine amount. You are not bound by the prison length and
fine amount provided above.
1. Prison
2. Probation
3. Fine

(Indicate a time length)
(Indicate a time length)
(Indicate the amount of the fine)

In the following space, please write down why you chose the particular sentence:

* The author acknowledges that the offense may warrant a higher sentence
under the statute.
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Case Two
FACTS
Mr. Dan Johnson, the owner of Metals, Inc., violated federal environmental laws between February 1987 and February 1989. Metals,
Inc., in Maryville, Ohio, is a metal-finishing firm that employed approximately thirty people.
Mr. Johnson is a college graduate.
Metals, Inc. discharged into the City of Maryville sewer system wastewater containing substances in excess of federal substance limts.
The City of Maryville alleged that it spent approximately $1,000 to
$10,000 per month above normal public utility operating costs to pretreat the water to make it safe for public use. The cost is an estimate
because the city could not exactly determine how much the substances
increased the operating costs of the utility. The public utility is the
sewer system that cleans the city water.
This was Mr. Johnson's first offense. Mr. Johnson has suffered extreme economic debt as a result of the litigation and the financial
problems of Metals, Inc.
The government did not present any proof that the wastewater discharge by Metals, Inc. harmed the public water. One violates an environmental law by simply discharging waste into a public utility The
violation is not based upon the level of harm, but the potential harm
to the environment.
CONVICTION*
The defendant was found guilty of violating federal environmental

laws. According to the statute, a violator shall be imprisoned between
fifteen and twenty-one months and fined not less than $5,000 nor
more than $50,000, or both.
SENTENCE
Circle the sentence you feel is appropriate. You may select more
than one. Acting as a judge, you may increase or decrease the prison
length and fine amount. You are not bound by the prison length and
fine amount provided above.
1. Prison
2. Probation
3. Fine

(Indicate a time length)
(Indicate a time length)
(Indicate the amount of the fine)

In the following space, please write down why you chose the particular sentence:

* The author acknowledges that the offense may warrant a higher sentence
under the statute.
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Case Three
FACTS
Mr. John Watson was the president of Printers, Inc., a printed circuit board company in Glendale, Indiana that employed approximately 300 people. He and three other employees were charged with
violating federal environmental laws based upon activities between
1987 and 1989.
Mr. Watson is a college graduate and a Korean War veteran. He
was the head of the Chamber of Commerce in Glendale.
Printers, Inc. discharged electroplating process waste into the Glendale sewer system and into a small brook that led into the Glendale
river. The sewer system cleans out waste from the water making it
safe for public use.
Printers, Inc. alleged that it employed a state-of-the-art pollution
control system to clean out the waste before the water went into the
sewer. The prosecution asserted that the company bypassed the pollution control system, thereby discharging untreated wastewater.
The president denied knowing that the company was violating environmental laws. For a criminal conviction in tis case, the law does
not require that the president knew of the discharged wastes. The
Judge said that he was unsure as to whether the president knew of the
discharged wastes.
CONVICTION*
The president pled guilty to twelve counts of violating federal environmental laws. According to the statute, a violator shall be imprisoned between ten and sixteen months and fined not less than $5,000
nor more than $50,000, or both.
SENTENCE
Circle the sentence you feel is appropriate. You may select more
than one. Acting as a judge, you may increase or decrease the prison
length and fine amount. You are not bound by the prison length and
fine amount provided above.
1. Prison
2. Probation
3. Fine

(Indicate a time length)
(Indicate a time length)
(Indicate the amount of the fine)

In the following space, please write down why you chose the particular sentence:

* The author acknowledges that the offense may warrant a lugher sentence
under the statute.
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B. Post-Test
Case One
FACTS
Mr. Roland Blake was the president and the chief executive officer
of Compusoft, a publicly held software company in Dallas, Texas, that
employed approximately 800 people. Mr. Blake and another employee were charged with violating federal securities laws. This case
concerns Mr. Blake.
Mr. Blake founded Compusoft in 1968. He has a college degree
and a master's degree in Industrial Engineering.
For approximately a year and a half, Mr. Blake and other company
employees conspired to defraud shareholders by issuing financial
statements which overstated the company's revenues and profits by
40%.
This was Mr. Blake's first offense. Mr. Blake did not make any
money from his securities activities.
CONVICTION*
The defendant was found guilty of violating federal securities laws.
According to the statute, a violator shall be imprisoned between
twenty-one and thirty-six months and fined not more than $1,000,000,
or both.
SENTENCE
Circle the sentence you feel is appropriate. You may select more
than one. Acting as a judge, you may increase or decrease the prison
length and fine amount. You are not bound by the prison length and
fine amount provided above.
1. Court Supervised Work
Not less than 750 hours of court-supervised work to include the
following:
a. Give lectures to ten professional computer organizations explainmg the defendant's violations and sanctions and providing
names of agencies to contact for information about existing securities laws.
b. Place advertisements, which will run for three weeks in local
papers, about the defendant's violations and encouraging compliance with securities laws.
c. Advertise and run a free six-week workshop open to the public
on how to run basic word processor computer programs.
d. If any hours are remaining, the defendant shall work for local
charitable organizations.
2. Prison

(Indicate a time length)

* The author acknowledges that the offense may warrant a higher sentence
under the statute.
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3. House Arrest
4. Regular Probation

(Indicate a time length)
(Indicate a time length)

- Offender visits the probation officer once a month
5. Strict Probation

(Indicate a time length)

- Offender sees the probation officer up to five times a week
6. Fine

(Indicate the amount of the fine)

In the following space, please write down why you chose the particular sentence:
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Case Two
FACTS
Mr. Dan Johnson, the owner of Metals, Inc., violated federal environmental laws between February 1987 and February 1989. Metals,
Inc., m Maryville, Ohio, is a metal-fimslung firm that employed approximately thirty people.
Mr. Johnson is a college graduate.
Metals, Inc. discharged into the City of Maryville sewer system wastewater containing substances in excess of federal substance limits.
The City of Maryville alleged that it spent approximately $1,000 to
$10,000 per month above normal public utility operating costs to pretreat the water to make it safe for public use. The cost is an estimate
because the city could not exactly determine how much the substances
increased the operating costs of the utility. The public utility is the
sewer system that cleans the city water.
Tins was Mr. Johnson's first offense. Mr. Johnson has suffered extreme economic debt as a result of the litigation and the financial
problems of Metals, Inc.
The government did not present any proof that the wastewater discharge by Metals, Inc. harmed the public water. One violates an environmental law by simply discharging waste into a public utility. The
violation is not based upon the level of harm, but the potential harm
to the environment.
CONVICTION*
The defendant was found guilty of violating federal environmental
laws. According to the statute, a violator shall be imprisoned between
fifteen and twenty-one months and fined not less than $5,000 nor
more than $50,000, or both.
SENTENCE
Circle the sentence you feel is appropriate. You may select more
than one. Acting as a judge, you may increase or decrease the prison
length and fine amount. You are not bound by the prison length and
fine amount provided above.

1. Court-Supervised Work
Not less than 500 hours of court-supervised work to include the
following:
a. Partially reimburse the city $10,000 for increasing operating
costs to pretreat the wastewater created by the defendant's
company.
b. Implement programs designed to educate the public about
environmental issues such as recycling, the depletion of the
ozone layer, etc.
* The author acknowledges that the offense may warrant a higher sentence
under the statute.
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c. Give lectures to the management of five metal-finishing
compames that explain the defendant's violations and the
hazards of disobeying federal and state environmental laws.
Provide the names of agencies to contact for information about
complying with existing environmental laws.
d. If any hours are remaining, the defendant shall assist the
EPA in any environmental cleanup efforts being conducted
within the state.
2. Prison
3. House Arrest
4. Regular Probation

(Indicate a time length)
(Indicate a time length)
(Indicate a time length)

- Offender visits the probation officer once a month
5. Strict Probation

(Indicate a time length)

- Offender sees the probation officer up to five times a week
6. Fine

(Indicate the amount of the fine)

In the following space, please write down why you chose the particular sentence:
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Case Three
FACTS
Mr. John Watson was the president of Printers, Inc., a printed circuit board company in Glendale, Indiana that employed approximately 300 people. He and three other employees were charged with
violating federal environmental laws based upon activities between
1987 and 1989.
Mr. Watson is a college graduate and a Korean War veteran. He
was the head of the Chamber of Commerce in Glendale.
Printers, Inc. discharged electroplating process waste into the Glendale sewer system and into a small brook that led into the Glendale
river. The sewer system cleans out waste from the water making it
safe for public use.
Printers, Inc. alleged that it employed a state-of-the-art pollution
control system to clean out the waste before the water went into the
sewer. The prosecution asserted that the company bypassed the pollution control system, thereby discharging untreated wastewater.
The president denied knowing that the company was violating environmental laws for a crmunal conviction in this case, the law does not
require that the president knew of the discharged wastes. The Judge
said that he was unsure as to whether the president knew of the discharged wastes.
This was the defendant's first offense. The company is out of
business.
CONVICTION*
The president pled guilty to violating federal environmental laws.
According to the statute, a violator shall be impnsoned between ten
and sixteen months and fined not less than $5,000 nor more the
$50,000, or both.
SENTENCE
Circle the sentence you feel is appropriate. You may select more
than one. Acting as a judge, you may increase or decrease the prison
length and fine amount. You are not bound by the prison length and
fine amount provided above.
1. Court-Supervised Work
Not less than 1,000 hours of court-supervised work to include the
following:
a. Implement programs designed to educate the public about environmental issues such as recycling, the depletion of the ozone
layer, etc.
* The author acknowledges that the offense may warrant a higher sentence
under the statute.
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b. Place an apology to run for three weeks in a local newspaper
explaining in detail what were the defendant's environmental violations and encouraging compliance with environmental laws.
c. Give lectures to the management of ten printed circuit board
companies, which explain the defendant's violations and the
hazards of disobeying federal and state environmental laws. Provide names of agencies to contact for information about complying with existing environmental laws.
d. If any hours are remaining, the defendant shall assist the EPA
in any environmental cleanup efforts being conducted within the
state.
2. Pnson
3. House Arrest

(Indicate a time length)
(Indicate a time length)

-Offender must stay home except to go to work
4. Regular Probation

(Indicate a time length)

- Offender sees the probation officer once a month
5. Strict Probation

(Indicate a time length)

- Offender sees the probation officer up to five time a week
6. Fine

(Indicate the amount of the fine)

In the following space, please write down why you chose the particular sentence:
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C. Information Sheet
1. Consider the following information regarding prison costs:
a. It costs a state more than $23,000 per year to house a prison
inmate.
b. In Wisconsin, it is projected that 13,000 more prison beds will
be needed by the year 2000 at a cost of $2 billion 1991 dollars.
The current costs of prison construction are $75,000 per inmate.
Financing the construction doubles the cost to $150,000 per
inmate.
c. An alternative sentence costs approximately $8,300 per offender and does not require the state to build more prisons.
2. Consider the following information about environmental laws
and sentences other than prison:
a. The goals of environmental laws are to mnimize the generation and improper disposal of hazardous wastes. Will prison
achieve these goals?
b. What should be the purpose of a sentence and how does the
purpose relate to the goals of the law?
(1) To restore the environment;
(2) To pumsh those who have harmed the environment;
(3) To impose a prison term on a violator in order to deter
other violators;
(4) To punsh offenders that are uncooperative with environmental agencies;
(5) To educate the public about environmental laws;
(6) To rehabilitate the offender.
c. Is it fair to send a violator to prison not just because of what
the violator did, but because the justice system wants to use this
offender as an example to deter future violators?
d. If the purpose is to educate and deter future violators consider
whether prison can effectively deter future violators if no one
hears about the sentence.
e. Is it appropriate in Case Three to send a corporate officer to
jail based upon an assumption that the president should have
known that the company was violating environmental laws?
f. Should some of the tax dollars spent on prosecuting a small
number of environmental violators also be used to assist companies in developing processes that generate less pollution?

